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BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU WISH FOR: HOW
ACCOUNTANTS AND CONGRESS CREATED
THE PROBLEM OF AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE
SEAN M. O'CONNOR*

Abstract: Although corporate fraud is not held in check by our current
audit process, in which auditors lack independence from the clients they
inspect, numerous attempts to fix this problem have failed. This Article
analyzes the history of auditing, which has been neglected in legal
scholarship, to argue that the mandatory audit system created the
problem of auditor independence. Accountants advocated for the system
in order to gain the status of a learned profession; however, they received
more than they bargained for. In partictular, auditors incurred an
obligation to the "investing public," but this undefined group does not
actually control the auditors. Auditors answer to the companies being
audited. The resulting conflict of interest has proven to be insurmountable. This Article argues that the problem will be resolved only by
returning to its origins in the federal securities laws of the 1930s and by
restructuring the relationships involved in public company audits.

INTRODUCTION

Anxious to respond quickly to the public outcry over the recent
financial scandals that had rocked the national economy the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency (the "Senate Committee") gathered in Room 301 of the Senate Office Building to hear testimony on a
quickly drafted bill to regulate the securities industry. The bill required
companies issuing securities to issue detailed financial statements that
would be certified by company directors. In turn, these directors would
* © 2004, Sean M. O'Connor, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington
School of Law. J.D., Stanford Law School; M.A., Arizona State University; B.A., University
of Massachusetts. I would like to thank William BrattonJohn Coffee, Larry Cunningham,
and Brian Mayhew for comments on an earlier draft. I am especially indebted to my research assistant, M6rk Murdock, for his tireless help in assembling the history of the securities laws, as well as to the amazing staff of the Marian Gould Gallagher Law Library at the
University of Washington School of Law for their help with all aspects of my research on
this subject. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the University of Washington
School of Law for my research and drafting of this article.
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then take on unlimited personal liability for the contents of the
certified statements. The bill was quite controversial, yet the public demanded sweeping reform, and such reform could not be painless.
During the hearings, experts testified that the boardrooms of
American companies would empty as even the most conscientious directors would refise to take on the risk of such liability. Perhaps directors could be given a defense of good faith reliance on the opinions of
certified public accountants or other qualified professionals. Who then
would be on the hook for inaccuracies in the financial statements? The
point was to have someone in control of the company take responsibilit), for the contents of the financial statements in order to counter the
temptation for the company to spin the statements for its own ends.
Colonel Akrthur H. Carter, President of the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants, appeared before the Senate Committee and suggested that the bill be amended to require a company issuing stock to have its financial statements certified by an accountant,
rather than simply to allow the government to call for an audit of a
company after any suspicions arose.' Mter all, he testified, eighty-five
percent of the companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (the
"NYSE") already voluntarily underwent outside audits. 2 The Senate
Committee was skeptical and asked the following questions:
"How much more and additional employment would that
3
give to certified accountants?"
"Do you think it proper to insert in there that these independent public accountants should be privileged to state
their opinion as to the value of securities or the condition of
4
the company?"
"Do you not think it is more in the interest of the public that
is to buy these securities, if there is to be any check up or any
guarantee as to the correctness, that it be done by some
Government agency rather than by some private association
of accountants?"5
I See Secinities Act of 1933: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currengc, 73rd Cong. (1933) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter), repfntcd in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES ACT OF
1934, at 56-62 (comp. bvJ.S. Ellenberger & Ellen P. Mahar, 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
2 See id. at 56, 60.

3Id. at 56.
4 Id.

5Id. at 57.
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"Who audits you?" 6

By the time the bill was enacted into law, however, Colonel Carter's suggestion was included-intentionally or otherwise-as part of
Schedule A to the Securities Act of 1933 (the "'33 Act"). 7 Financial
statements would have to be certified by an "independent public or
certified accountant" prior to any public offering of securities. 8 But
there was a catch: section 11 of the '33 Act provides investors with a
civil cause of action against most of the parties involved in preparing
registration statements-expressly including accountants-with damages measured as the loss in value of the securities purchased. 9
The certification requirement resulted in a windfall of business for
the developing accounting profession, only somewhat tempered by the
liability provisions. The accountants seemed happy; Congress seemed
pleased with itself; and the public appeared mollified. After all, professional audits were already a part of the business landscape--especially
after expanding in the rnid-1800s in tandem with the spiraling complexity of businesses and financial markets touched off by the new factories and production methods of the Industrial Revolution. 10 So why
not just adopt the practice officially through federal legislation?
The problem was that by codifying a relatively new "best practice," which was employed by only a subset of stock-issuing companies,
in a federal law that mandated this practice for all companies, Congress commodified and thus, destroyed the real premium-signaling
value of the practice. Further, it froze in time an experiment in controlled public disclosure of what had been heretofore very much private audits commissioned by the company, its shareholders, or creditors for only their eyes.
Additionall), Congress seemed to have included some of the
audit provisions from the various British Companies Acts without a
full understanding of the long history and context in which those
provisions developed. It is true that British companies at the time
were required to have an auditor review the proposed financial statements and reports of the directors of the company before the), became finalized. These audit reports then could be used in public of6 SceHeatings,supra note 1, at 58 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
7 Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000))
(also known as the "Fletcher-Rayburn Securities Act of 1933" and the "Truth in Securities
Act").
8 15 U.S.C. § 77aa, sched. A, 25.
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Some limitations on this liability are discussed iifra notes 310-441.
10See infra notes 22-238 and accompanying text.
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ferings of stock. This "auditor," however, was an officer of the cornpan), although only in the auditor capacity, and did not have to be an
accountant. In fact, the company auditor officer position belonged to
a well-established heritage that included trusted servants in English
manorial households who were responsible for monitoring other servants' use of household assets. Auditors also might have been townspeople elected to monitor a government official's use of public assets." The real requirements for an individual to be appointed a
company auditor were that the individual could not also have been a
director or officer of the company and that the individual must have
been elected or appointed by the shareholders at the annual meeting.
Thus, in the British system, professional accountants were still
working under private commission for parties who were investigating
the accounting of others. Of particular note, accountants were hired
by the "auditor" (shareholder) of a British company to help that auditor examine the directors' reports. Under the '33 Act, however, U.S.
companies were only required to have an "independent public or

certified accountant" review the financial statements for a registration
statement. Because it was not specified otherwise, the job of commissioning the accountant fell to company management, even though
the), were part of the very group that the certification or audit process
was supposed to monitor!

Finally based on the stated investor focus of the '33 Act-emphasizing the principle of caveat venditor as much as the more traditional securities industry principle of caveat etptoi-courts and commentators have maintained consistently that accountants certifying
statements under the '33 Act 12 are acting as much on behalf of the
public trust as they are for their paying client, the company' 3 This
bifurcated allegiance, however, was bound to promote conflict and

controversy. 14 Agents cannot successfully serve two principals with potentially adverse interests. The concept of "auditor independence"
and the lab)Tinthian rules promulgated to try to define and enforce it

II See infra notes 22-238 and accompanying text.

12This claim also has been made under the similar annual certification required by
rules promulgated under the later Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 73-291,
48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hhh (2000)).
13See infra notes 447-489 and accompanying text.
14See generally Sean M. O'Connor, The Itevitability ofEwon and the Inpossibility of "Auditor Independence" Under the CurrentAudit System (2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=303181 (date posted Mar. 11, 2002).
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have arisen as major issues, primarily because of this legally mandated
divided allegiance of auditors.
Part I of this Article proceeds by clarifying the development of
accounting into a profession through the dawn of the twentieth century.15 Part II looks at the profession in the early decades of that century and focuses on its quest for greater prestige and increased service
engagements. 16 This Part also describes the profession's move into the
lobbying arena, culminating in its role in the passage of the Income
Tax Act of 1913.17 Part III discusses the circumstances and debate sur-

rounding the passage of the '33 Act.18 Finall), Part IV considers developments after the '33 Act, including passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 193419 (the "'34 Act"), and rulemaking under both laws
that followed the lead of the certification requirement of the '33
Act. 20 The Article concludes by arguing that Congress unwittingly created the problem of auditor independence when-at the accountants'
own request-it included the financial statement certification re21
quirement in the '33 Act.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACCOUNTING INTO A PROFESSION

A. BriefHistory of Accounting
The beginning of modern accounting, in the form of double-entry
bookkeeping, dates back to the end of the fifteenth centur), 22 but it was
not until the nineteenth century that the true systems of accounting
developed. 23 Further, prior to the mid-nineteenth century few individuals held themselves out as "public accountants," meaning that
the), practiced their craft through their own proprietary. businesses.
See inf"a notes 22-238 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239-285 and accompanying text.
17See infra notes 286-310 and accompanying text.
ISSee infra notes 311-446 and accompanying text.
1915 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hhh (2000).
20 See infra notes 447-473 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 474-490 and accompanying text.
22 See A.C. LITTLETON, ACCOUNTING EVOLUTION TO 1900, at 12-21 (3rd ed., Garland
Publ'g, Inc. 1988). In 1494, an Italian monk named Fra Luca Pacioli formalized and catalogued the then-current state of bookkeeping, including a description of early doubleentry bookkeeping, in his book Summa de Ayithmetica Gcometpia, Proportionii et Proportioninalita. See Richard H. Macve, Pacioli's Legacy, in ACCOUNTING HISTORY FROM THE RENAISSANCE: A REMEMBRANCE OF LUCA PACIOLI 3-30 (T.A. Lee et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter
15
16

ACCOUNTING HISTORY].
23 See LITTLETON, supra

note 22, at 165; see alSOJOHN L. CAREY,

COUNTING PROFESSION: FROM TECHNICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL,

THE RISE OF THE

Ac-

1896-1936, at 17-19 (1969).
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Even fewer individuals were able to have a public accounting practice
as their only source of income. 24 Others who considered themselves
accountants or bookkeepers were likely full-time employees of the
sundry business enterprises of the day. 25 In fact, one major accounting
historian has suggested that there were no real accountants before the
26
nineteenth century, only bookkeepers.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution and the concomitant
shift fiom an agrarian to a capital intensive, industrial economy business and financial structures became markedly more complicated. This
required more rigorous theories and systems of bookkeeping, which, in
turn, led to formal accounting. 27 The passage of early modern corporation law statutes in Great Britain and the United States came in tandem
with this economic shift.28 Some of the most salient features of these
new statutes included the perpetual existence of a duly formed and
maintained corporation, and an allowance for the entity to have a
broadly stated business purpose. 29 The shift from limited term business
partnerships that effected one specific venture-for- instance, a single
overseas trade expedition-to perpetual corporations with ongoing
ventures, prompted the shift from so-called "agency bookkeeping" to
"proprietorship bookkeeping." 30 This shift, in turn, caused bookkeeping to evolve into accounting by "transforming a mere method of systematically recording exchanges into a means of giving business man31
agement an effective control over its affairs."
Of course, as the number and size of corporate industrial activities grew, the reach of their economic impact grew as well. As a result,
corporate industries increasingly had a financial impact on a greater
segment of the general public, including employees, managers,
SeeCAREY, supra note 23, at 18-19; LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 265.
Today one such position is that of the company "controller" or "comptroller." See A
HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS LAW TERMS 128-29, 145 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 1999).
26 See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 271-84, 361-68. In fact, the title of "accomptant"
for an independent professional does not seem to appear in directories in England until
after 1766. See id. at 267.
27 John Richard Edw,%-ards, Financial Accounting Practice 1600-1970: Continuity and
Change, in ACCOUNTING HISTORY, supra note 22, at 31-45.
28 SeeJOEL SELIGMAN, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-18 (1995).
29 See id.
30 See LITrLETON, supra note 22, at 155-61. "Agency bookkeeping" developed from the
"charge and discharge" records kept by servants for masters arising in the medieval feudal
system and pertained simply to explaining the servant's activities with the master's goods
and property. See id; see also infia note 112 and accompanying text. "Proprietorship bookkeeping" focused instead on the "continuing investment of capital variously employed and
periodically summarized." See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 156.
sI See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 165.
21

25
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shareholders, creditors, and debtors.3 2 At the same time, extensive
formal capital markets were developing-notably in London 33-and
stock exchanges were beginning to list substantial numbers of corporate securities over and above their earl), focus on government securities. 34 Within these markets, more investors from the general public

began buying corporate securities (particularly railway company
stock) and losing money through questionable circumstances that led
to declines in share value. Industries either had to regulate themselves
or suffer imminent government financial regulation. 35 A number of
companies responded by issuing regular periodic financial statements
to shareholders.3 6 At the same time, new bankruptcy laws in England,
premised on some disastrous failings of rail and other ventures,
helped to create a new market for individuals skilled in bookkeeping
and early accounting methods. 3 Nevertheless, the new corporate
structure also was used to defraud investors outright through worthless or "watered" stock issued from sham corporations. 38
In England, one important response to the foregoing problems
was the passage of an interrelated system of statutes, often referred to
generally as the "Companies Acts," beginning in the mid-1800s. The
lineage of these statutes actually extends further back to the South
Sea Bubble of the early 1700s. During the peak of this well-known example of early speculative frenzy in stock trading, Parliament passed a
law reasserting the restriction of incorporation authority to the Crown
and Parliament.3 9 The Bubble Act expressly authorized King George
supra note 28, at 3-18; see also LIrrLETON, Supra note 22, at 205-22.
See CAREY, supra note 23, at 18; Edwkards, supra note 27, at 36. Note that the Industrial Revolution commenced in England before it was brought to the United States. Thus,
in many corporate and securities law advances, developments occurred in England before
appearing in the United States.
34See Edwards, supra note 27, at 35-40.
35 See id. The explosive growth of the rail system in England led to one of the earliest
episodes when capital requirements were so great that investment by a significant portion
of the general public ,as necessary. See id. It would appear that episodes such as thisdespite the ensuing scandals-actually whetted the public's appetite for corporate securities investment, as some individuals watched others become fabulous" rich off a few wellplaced investments.
32 See SELIGMAN,
33

36 See id.
37 See

LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 271-84.

38 See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 11-16 (stating that the bubble was a result of a mIr-

iad of companies attempting to offer shares to the public in emulation of the success of
the South Sea Company).
39 See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of CorporateLaw: A Cross-Coi ntrj Comparison,
23 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 806-07 (2002); Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L.
REv. 77, 94-96 (2003). Because European countries traditionally viewed incorporation as
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to grant charters for two companies: the first company would be for
the purpose of assuring ships and merchandise at sea, and the second
company would be for the purpose of "lending money on bottomrry" 40 In addition, the Bubble Act flatly extinguished virtually all
other existing companies that were not created under a valid royal
charter or parliamentary act. It also prohibited an), new corporations
from forming, or "presuming to act as corporate bodies," without
enabling charters or statutes. 41 The Bubble Act actually may have precipitated the disastrous bursting of the South Sea Bubble, or it simply
may have been concomitant with it. One commentator, however, has
suggested that it was the first example of a recurrent pattern of eco42
nomic boom, bust, and over-reactive regulation.
It took.more than a hundred years for Parliament to move past its
concerns over unregulated 'Joint stock companies" 43 and repeal the
Bubble Act via the Bubble Companies Act of 1825.44 Parliament's reward for doing so wvas the unbridled "railway mania" speculation of
the 1830s and 1840s alluded to above. Thus, Parliament yet again was
prompted to pass legislation to restrict joint stock companies. This

time, however, it responded with regulation rather than prohibition.

possible only by permission of the sovereign-the "concession" system-individuals in
Great Britain simply had no rights to incorporate without such a concession prior to the
1800s. See Pistor et al, supra, at 806-07. They nonetheless found ways to skirt this general
restriction, sometimes by buying charters from "moribund" companies. Id. at 806. The
passage of the Bubble Act itself seemed to suggest that, at other times, enterprising individuals simply waffled on the form of their business venture, running the grey area between a large partnership and a true "corporation"-with or without "legal authority." See
6 Geo., c. 18 (1719) (Eng.). Thus, there was a need to "reassert" the exclusive authority of
the sovereign.
40 6 Geo., c. 18. The first granting power clearly was directed to restrict the power to
create an), more overseas trading expeditions, such as the original South Sea Company, to
the Crown. "Bottomry" is the maritime law term for secured lending transactions for use,
equipment, or repair of a ship, using the ship itself (or its keel or "bottom") as security.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 197 (8th ed. 2004). In the event that the ship was lost during a
specified journey or time period, the lender lost his money. See id.
41 6 Geo., c. 18. The captions of the relevant sections of the Bubble Act state, "After 24
June 1720, all undertakings tending to the prejudice of trade, and all subscriptions, &c.
thereto, or presuming to act as corporate bodies without legal authority, and all acting
under obsolete charters, &c. shall be deemed illegal and void." Id.
42 See Ribstein, siipra note 39, at 96.
43 ".An unincorporated association of individuals possessing common capital, the capital being contributed by the members and divided into shares, of which each member
possesses a number of shares proportionate to the member's investment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, sipra note 40, at 298.
44 6 Geo. 4, c. 91 (Eng.).
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In particular, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 184445 provided
that companies could choose to incorporate without royal charter or
parliamentary act ("free registration" or "free incorporation"), provided they registered with the Registry Office, an entity newly created
by the Act, in compliance with a prescribed schedule of information. 46
Further, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 required that registration occur before any "Prospectus, Handbill, or Advertisement" was
distributed to the public. 47 Upon the filing of the registration form, a
company would receive a provisional certificate of incorporation, but
could not receive its "Certificate of complete registration" until certain other formalities were executed in writing by shareholders. 48 The
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 contains an interesting combination of regulations anticipating, and influencing, U.S. federal securities laws, much of which is clearly directed toward protecting shareholders. 49 Of relevant note is a provision for audits and auditors to be
elected by the shareholders, which will be discussed in Part I.B, together with the further evolution of this statute.50
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 expressly did iiot extend
to either "charter" or "statutory" companies. 5 1 Because Parliament was
creating an increasing number of statutory companies, however, it
apparently was tiring of repeating what was becoming a standard litany of provisions for governance of the companies. In response, it
passed the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act in 1845 (the "1845
Companies Clauses Act").52 This legislation also sought to codify numerous provisions for the protection of shareholders, including requirements for audits and auditors. 53 Similarl), the Chartered Companies Act of 1837 allowed the Crown to create corporations by issu45

7 & 8 Vict., c. 110 (Eng.).

46 Sec id. sched. C (setting forth prescribed information in Schedule C). This legisla-

tion moved England permanently away from the sole "concession" model of corporate
bodies and into the modern era of "free registration." See Pistor, supranote 39, at 806-07.
47 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110. Clearly the joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 established a forerunner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") and anticipated modern
securities regulation through registration and disclosure. See id. at § 4.
48 See id. §§ 4, 7.
49 At the same time, England w,-as not the first to move to free registration; that honor

fell to the State of NewYork in 1811. SecAct of Mar. 22, 1811, ch. 67, 1811 N.Y Laws 151-52.
10 See infra notes 106-230 and accompanying text.
51 See 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110. That is, the joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 did not extend
to those companies created by royal charter or Parliamentary act, respectively. Sec id.
52 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16 (Eng.); sec also 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 8
(Andrew Davies ed., 4th ed. 1999) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S STATUTES].
13 See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
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ing letters patent, rather than solely through the lengthier process of
granting a royal charter, so long as companies created by such letters
patent adhered to the provisions of the Act.5 4 No express provision for
audits or auditors was included in this legislation, however.5 5
Al though the provisions for "auditors" in the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 and the 1845 Companies Clauses Act did not encompass accountants specifically, as will be discussed below, companyelected auditors increasingly hired and relied on public accountants
to fulfill their duties under these statutes.5 6 Thus, this evolution in
corporate law in England provided still more work for accountants,
and yet another impetus to develop a true profession. Over time, accountants-often "chartered accountants" as described below-were
elected directly as company auditors.5 7
At the same time, the growing awareness of, and focus on, the
corporation as a distinct legal person led to a new perspective in accounting-the "entity theory)" This approach viewed bookkeeping as
"primarily concerned with accounting to 'outsiders' for all property
entrusted from without to 'the business' and dedicated to its purposes."58 Several scholars have noted that the "entity theory" was said
to be "quite opposite to the proprietorship theory in which bookkeeping is viewed as an accounting by the proprietor for his own
property in detail and in total."5 9 Ironically, this was also a shift away
from the relatively new "proprietorship accounting" back to the older
"agency accounting."60
This new accounting perspective comported with the growing
sense that some of the fundamental issues inherent in the new corpo61
rate forms were predicated on conflicted agency relationships.
54 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 73, §§ 2-32 (Eng.).
55 Overall, governance of the corporation is not as detailed in the Chartered Compa-

nies Act of 1837 as it is under either the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 or the 1845
Companies Clauses Act. This is perhaps because fewer corporations were being formed by
charter and/or because the Crown granted more deviation in governance structures
among its chartered companies than Parliament was granting in its statute companies. See
Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16; Chartered Companies Act, 1837, 7 Will. 4
& 1 Vict., c. 73.
56 See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
58 LITTLETON, sulpra note 22, at 191.

59 Id.
60 See id. at 193.
61 This view finds its greatest expression much later, of course, in the seminal work by
Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means on the agency implications of separated ownership and management. See generally A. BERLE & G. MlEANS, THE MIODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 112-16 (rev. ed. 1968) (1932).
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Whereas the earlier corporations had a relatively small number of
shareholders, the new corporations drew increasingly on unprecedented numbers of shareholders. 62 As the stock exchanges became
more robust, allowing for a marvelous liquidity of many companies'
shares, the now ever-changing "shareholder" often became as fingible
as the shares he or she held. 63 Thus, the sense of the shareholder as
an "owner" of the business in an), meaningfil sense was rapidly deteriorating. This alteration in the conception of shareholders was surprising given that one of the core purposes of the corporate model
was separating management from ownership so that businesses could
draw on a far larger and more stable pool of capital than would be
available from even the largest xiable partnership models of business.
Nonetheless, the shift had some profound and unexpected consequences for the business and financial environment.
As discussed above, England embarked on a long and convoluted
path of three distinct corporate law lineages largely intended to protect shareholders through inter alia audit and auditor requirements
drawing upon the well-established British audit tradition.64 In contrast, no requirements for-or protections by way of-auditors appeared to be available in the United States under either federal or
state law before the enactment of the federal securities laws in the
1930s. 65 At the same time, the United States initially lagged behind
Great Britain in industrialization and the development of sophisticated financial markets. 66 Further, the United States largely avoided
some of the extreme stock speculative frenzies that roiled Great Britain and Europe, 67 which may have limited the interest in regulating
corporations, securities, and accountants through legislation.
All of these factors arguably led to the development of an accounting profession in the United States later than in Great Britain,
in terms of both numbers of accountants and formal organizations.68
Of particular note, the precursor to the Institute of Chartered Ac-

62 See LITrLETON, supra note

22, at 205-06.

63 See id. at 203.

r See infra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
6 See SELIGMAN, supra note 28, at 3-18.
6 See, e.g., R.R. PALMER &JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 435 (6th
ed. 1984).
67 See LITrLETON, supra note 22, at 255.
6 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 18-22, 34 (noting, for example, 11 accountants listed in
London in 1799, growing to 210 by 1850; compared with 14 accountants in New York in
1850, growing to 115 by 1886).
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countants of Scotland (the "ICAS") received a royal charter in 1854.69
The accounting societies in England formed around the same time,
but did not receive their royal charter-as the unified Institute of

Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (the "ICAEW")-until
1880.70 In the United States, the first formal association for public accountants and precursor to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (the "AICPA") did not appear until 1887, and even then
71
it had no authority other than itself.
Similarl); although the ICAEW introduced mandatory qualifying
examinations in 1882 to regulate who could adopt the title of Fellow
Chartered Accountant, 72 there was no examination requirementprivate or public-in the United States until 1896. At that time, New
York passed a law to regulate accountants who desired to practice un73
der the new title of "certified public accountant" ("CPA"). Over the

69Se id. at 19; see also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., ICAS Celebrates 150
Years, at http:/ /uia: icas.org.uk/ site/ cms/v4_newsArticleView.asp?article= 295 7 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). The original charter was granted to the Society of Accountants in Edinburgh, while the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow received its royal charter in 1855, and the Society of Accountants in Aberdeen received its royal charter in 1867.
See CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; see also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., supra.
Collectivel, the societies were known as the "Chartered Accountants of Scotland," and
their members were the only individuals in the United Kingdom who could use the designation "Chartered Accountant" or "CA." See CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; see also INST. OF
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., supra. A Supplemental Charter in 1951 merged the
three societies and gave rise to the current name. See CAREY, slupra note 23, at 19; seealso
INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF SCOT., supra.
70 SeeCAREY, supra note 23, at 19-20; see also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG.
& VALES, Governance and Structure: History and Overview, at http://www.icaewAco.uk/
index.cfm?AUB=TB2I_49070,MNXI_49070&route= 11295,P,11388,11389,49070 (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004). Local societies in London, Liverpool, Manchester, and Sheffield were merged
to create the hIstitute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (the "ICAEW"). See
CAREY, supra note 23, at 19; see also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WVALES,
supra.
71 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 22; see also Ai. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,
Sunwiary of AICPA Operations, at http://wwvaicpa.org/about/summary.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2004).
72See CAREY, supra note 23, at 20, 39. "Fellow Chartered Accountant" ("FCA") signified
a partner or proprietor in practice, while "Associate Chartered Accountant" ("ACA")
signified a qualified member of an FCA's staff, or a member of the ICAEW not in active
practice. Both FCAs and ACAs might be referred to casually as "chartered accountants." See
id. at 20; see also INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & WALES, supra note 70.
73Act of Apr. 17, 1896, ch. 312, 1896 N.X Laws 263-64. The original law required
those seeking the "certified public accountant" ("CPA") designation, including use of the
abbreviation "C.P.A." or any similar "words, letters or figures" that would indicate the same
(1) to be either U.S. citizens, or to have declared an intention to so become, (2) to reside
or to have a place of regular business in New York, (3) to be over the age of twenty-one,
and (4) to be of good moral character. Id. at § 1. Certification authority fell to the Regents
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next decade, similar laws followed in Pennsylvania, 74 Maryland, 75 California, 76 Washington, 77 Illinois, 78 New Jersey, 79 Florida,8 0 and Michi-

gan.8 1 Of important note for later development, however, the U.S.
state laws granted certification authority to certification boards not
linked directly to either the accountant's local or national professional associations. This bifuircation of the certification process from
the professional association arguably weakened the ability of either
state or professional authorities to police issues such as auditor independence effectively. By comparison, the accounting professions in
Scotland, on the one hand, and England and Wales, on the other,
each have a unitary source of certification and association, as well as
the express (and enforceable) public interest mandate of royal char82
tered organizations.
A major additional benefit of royal chartering to the U.K. accounting organizations was "'the prestige attaching to [royal charters].'"83 Chartering fuirther operated as a device to separate indixiduals with specific training and expertise in accounting from the increasof the University of the State of New Xbrk. See id. at §§ 1-2; People v. Marlowe, 203 NA:S.
474, 474 (Ct. Sp. Sess. 1923). The Regents were empowered to create a board of examiners, that would be comprised of three members, all of whom were to be CPAs beginning
after 1897. See Act of Apr. 17, 1896, § 2. Certification could be revoked for cause after notice and a hearing. See id. The examination requirement could be waived only for public
accountants in practice for at least one year before passage of the Act, provided that such
accountant applied for waiver within one year after passage of the Act. See id. at § 3. Violations of the Act were made misdemeanors. See id. at § 4.
74See Act of Mar. 29, 1899, No. 17, 1899 Pa. Laws 21-22.
75SeeAct of Apr. 10, 1900, ch. 719, 1900 Md. Laws 1148-1149.
76 See Act of Mar. 23, 1901, ch. 213, 1901 Cal. Stat. 645-646.
77 SeeAct of Mar. 12, 1903, ch. 72, 1903 Wash. Laws 99-101.
,8 See Act of May 15, 1903, 1903111. Laws 281-283.
79See Act of Apr. 5, 1904, ch. 230, 1904 N.J. Laws 400-404.
8o SeeAct ofJune 5, 1905, 1905 Fla. Laws ch. 5425, §§ 106-108.
8 See Act of May 4, 1905, No. 92, 1905 Mich. Pub. Acts 130-132.
82_See INST. OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENG. & N\ALES, sttpra note 70; INST. OF
supra note 69; see also INST. OF CHARTERED AcRoyal Charterof the lith May 1880 [hereinafter Royal Charter],
available at http://wwvwicaew.co.uk/in dex.cfm?AUB=TB2I 29914 ,MNXI_29914 (last visited Oct. 1, 2004). Of note, the ICAEW's 1880 Royal Charter also prohibits FCAs from
splitting fees with persons in other professions, including fees in the form of commissions,
which anticipates similar prohibitions coming into effect much later in the U.S. profession.
See Royal Charte7; supra.
83 CARE, supra note 23, at 20 (quoting SIR HAROLD HowrTr, THE HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN ENGLAND AND WVALES (1966)). In fact, the
ICAEW's Royal Charter wras premised explicitly on the hope that such a charter would
bring "public recognition of the importance of the profession and would tend to gradually
raise its character." Royal Charte; supra note 82.
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS

OF SCOT.,

COUNTANTS IN ENG. & NVALES,
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ing numbers of both well-intentioned, and not so well-intentioned,
untrained persons who held themselves out as public accountants to
satisfy the booming demand for accounting services. 84
As substantial amounts of British capital began to flow to the
United States to finance the latter's industrialization, the now wellrespected Scottish and British chartered accountants followed to
monitor the capital owners' investments. 85 These British capital owners seemed reluctant to hire U.S. accountants86-even though one
would guess that travel expenses alone would have driven up the cost
of British and Scottish accountants over their American counterparts.
This was possibly a further demonstration of the power of the accreditation that came with royal charters. 87 A further insult to American
accountants was that even -Anerican businesses favored British and
Scottish accountants.88 At the same time, a number of the chartered
accountants from the United Kingdom wound up staying in the
United States permanently and helped to establish some of the largest
firms there, including some firms that continue to exist today 89
The practice of most U.S.-trained public accountants towards the
end of the nineteenth century was similar to that of U.K. accountants
before industrialization, chartering, and the passage of the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1844. They helped businesses and individuals keep
a proper set of books, generated financial statements for the client's
internal use, and audited their books and inventories to guard against
embezzling managers and subordinates. 90 This was pure "public accounting," in which services were provided solely for the benefit of
paying clients. 91 Duties and liabilities ran primarily to the client and
consisted mainly of a duty to the client, and express third-party
beneficiaries, to perform accounting services "with the care and can-

81See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 282-84.
8 SCCAREY; supra note 23, at 21-22, 27-28.
See id. at 21-22, 27, 33-34.
This reluctance to hire U.S. accountants was especially pronounced in the period
before U.S. state CPA laws came into effect.
88See CAREY, supra note 23, at 26-28, 34.
89PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, for example, was established by British chartered accountants in the United States. See id. at 27-28.
90See id. at 25-26.
91 The discussion in these paragraphs does not encompass the imminent arrival of the
expanded use of audited statements for the benefit of creditors and other third parties,
which will be discussed below. See infra notes 326-338 and accompanying text.
86
87
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tion proper to their calling." 92 There was expressly no notion or duty
pertaining to a "public calling" or obligations on behalf of the general
public: "public accountants are public only in the sense that their
serxices are offered to any one who chooses to employ them. This is
far from saying that those who do not employ them are in the same
93

position as those who do."
Further, the new state CPA laws added no obligations to the general public. 94 Instead, state laws simply limited use of the designation
"C.P.A." and similar "words, letters or figures" to individuals who met
the state's professional criteria. 95 Nonetheless, the CPA laws generally
were welcomed by the American profession. 96 In part, the laws
seemed to be an acknowledgment of the "arrival" of accounting as an
important profession, in the same league as law and medicine. 97 The
accountant's embrace of state laws also was influenced partially by the
profession's own initiatives to gain credibility and stature. 98 In New
York, the State Legislature and the Regents of the University of the
State of New York apparently did not think that the unregulated practice of public accounting was of itself as important or dangerous as,
say, medicine. Indeed, the), opted for a law that set out requirements
only for those holding themselves out as "certified public accountants" (or other "expert" designations), instead of a law regulating all
public accountants.9 9 The other states who were early adopters of CPA
laws also followed this model. 0 0 Of course, these states may simply
have been following the chartered accountant model from Great Britain. In the U.K. system, there was no general regulation of "accountants," but instead only a royal charter that gave the chartered societies, such as the ICAEW, the sole power to grant specific titles variant
on the theme of "chartered accountant."
92 See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y 1931). This case also contemplates a duty not to defraud any foreseeable users of the accountant's audit certificates,
as will be discussed below. See infa notes 311-444 and accompanying text.
93See Ultramares,174 N.E. at 448.
94See supra notes 73-81.
95Sec,
e.g., supra note 73.
96 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 43-45.
97 See Marlowe, 203 N.YS. at 479.
98 In fact, other accountants, along with the precursor of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA"), had pushed for legislation recognizing the
profession as early as 1894. See CAREY, supra note 23, at 43-44. This is not surprising given
the effect that chartering seems to have had on the prestige of their British and Scottish
counterparts.
99Marlowe, 203 N.YS. at 477; CAREY, supra note 17, at 43-44.
100 See supra notes 74-81.
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The development of this sort of accredited profession-within-aprofession in the United States, however, led to challenges as to the
authority of states to qualify CPAs-in particular, when the state rules
conflicted with or overruled a "certification" granted by a nongovernmental entit 10 1 These states ran up against private organizations purporting to grant the "degree" of certified public accountant,
and the concomitant claim that successful candidates of these programs should be allowed to use the "CPA" designation regardless of
state law on the matter. 10 2 In 1923, in People v. Marlowe, a New York
court rejected these claims as precluded by the state's police and welfare powers.103 Further, the court was quick to point out that the legislature was not regulating all of public accounting, but rather providing a particular way for highly qualified accountants to claim a measurable level of expertise.10 4 The new accreditation also raised
questions as to the various legislatures' choice of the term "certified
public accountant." One noted accounting historian has suggested
that a variation on "chartered accountant" was considered, but rejected on the grounds that it might conflict with the rights of the
chartered accountants from the British Isles-who continued to have
a strong presence in the United States. Additionall); the American
accountants themselves did not want to seem to be aping their British
and Scottish counterparts. 0 5
B. Development of the Modern CoporateAudit in Britain
The foregoing model of pure public accounting, of course, is
oversimplified in one regard-it does not include the audit function
10 6
that would become a cornerstone of the modern CPA practice.
101In the United Kingdom, this problem likely was blunted or was eliminated simply
because of the broader power of the Crown.
102See, e.g., Marlowe, 203 N.Y.S. at 475-76.
103Id. at 476-77. Legislation was "in the public interest and for the general welfare" in
order to "regulate the highly skilled and technical profession of public [accounting]." Id.
104 See id. at 477. Perhaps this was yet another reason for adopting a limited accreditation model in the United States, rather than a strict regulation of all accountants.
105 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 44-45. John L. Carey further notes that the title "public
accountant" was so well established by individual accountants and in the names of professional associations, that "the simple addition of the prefix 'certified' seemed to meet with
general approval." Id. at 45. But perhaps state legislatures preferred it because it was more
accurate; they were establishing criteria to certify accounting professionals much as they
provided for certification of other professionals, such as doctors and lawyers. There was
simply no "charter" or "chartering" involved.
106 See LI-rLETON, sutpra note 22, at 259 (stating that "[o]ne of the elements of accounting which definitely distinguishes it from bookkeeping is auditing").
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That is in part because the audit finction that is now ivell established
evolved through some unexpected twists and turns that vill provide
the narrative for the rest of this Article. The contemporary notion of
an audit as an examination of financial books and records by a professional accountant is only one specific instance of the larger context in
which the term and concept originated. In one limited and technical
sense, "auditing"-as simply a process of checking financial records
for errors-may be traced all the way back to Fra Luca Pacioli in the
fifteenth century. 107 The tradition that leads to our contemporary
audit, however, is not actually that of the accountant or bookkeeper
per se. Instead, it dates back to the practice commencing in thir-

teenth century Great Britain wherein regular members of a community or enterprise were charged by their fellows to act as "awdytours"
to "verif, the honesty of persons charged with fiscal, rather than
managerial, responsibilities."108 Such persons to be audited included
both government and private enterprise officials. 109
This audit process also found a natural home in the manors of
England from the fourteenth century onward, where the auditor
would have been the most trusted member of the household staff." 0
The auditor would "hear the accounts" presented by all his or her fellow servants in the manor who were charged with control of money or
property. Accordingly, the auditor had substantial power, including a
role in legal proceedings brought against unfaithful servants." 1 AlI of
107See

id. For background on Fra Luca Pacioli and his contributions, see supra note 16.

108 See LrlrLETON, supra note 22, at 260-61. For example, beginning in 1310, "'six

good men of the city, elected in the presence of the whole commonalty'" were to audit the
chamberlain of the City of London. Id.
109See id.
110See id. at 261-62. The auditor's importance in the manor is reflected in the following statement:
"The auditor being the laste of all officers, is to bee judge betwixte the lorde
and his accomptants, and to deale trulie for and beetween all parties, and
upon the determination of his audite, to presente to his lorde by booke or
breviate, all his receipts, expenses, imprestes; whatsoeve; with the remaines
of monye, if any bee."
Id. (quoting an unsigned statement written in 1605). Further, an early fourteenth century
book on estate management advised that "'[t]he auditors ought to be faithful and prudent.'" Id. at 262 (quoting Walter of Henley HUSBANDRY).
M See id. at 262 ("[A] statute of Edward I in 1285 ... provided that servants found 'in
arrearages upon the account could be sent to prison by the testimony of the auditor.'").
This early practice of literally "hearing the accounts" was based on the limited ability to
read and write among the general population and led to the use of the term "auditor" in
the first place. See id.
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these earl), audits were premised on an earlier bookkeeping method
of "charge and discharge," which simply tracked money and property
"charged" to a servant as that servant "discharged" them through the
intended disposition of the master. 1 2 The audits themselves were not
necessarily viewed as accounting or bookkeeping exercises. Early examples of proto-audit certificates included statements in audit reports
for the City of Aberdeen from 1586 through 1587, which noted that
the accounts had been "'Heard, seen, considerit, calculat, and allowit
3
by the auditors,' and 'futit, calculat and endit by Auditors.'""
One noted accounting historian summed up these early audits as
falling into two general categories: (1) "more or less public hearing[s]
of the results of the fiscal activities of governmental officers by delegated representatives of the citizens[,]" and (2) "careful scrutiny by a
trusted officer of the manor of the 'charge and discharge' accounts of
those household officers who had fiscal responsibilities."" 4 The common theme, of course, was the delegated authority by those who had
valuable interests in certain assets to a trusted agent, working solely
on their behalf. This person was to check up on the use of those assets
by other agents who had been charged with their disposition. In standard agency law terms, a principal would authorize one agent to investigate the activities of another agent. Under standard common law
agency principles, both agents had clear, enforceable fiduciary duties
15
running to the principal.
Put into the foregoing context, then, it is not surprising that a
"statutory audit" was included in both the Joint Stock Companies Act
of 1844 and the 1845 Companies Clauses Act." 6 Further, both statutes7
required that the shareholders appoint at least one of the auditors."
There was also no requirement that auditors be accountants,1 18 again
harkening back to the origins of the audit provision in the older Eng112 See Edwuards, supra note 27, at 32-33.

113LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 263. "Futit" signified "footed," as in the modern practice of referring to tabulations as "footings."
114 Id. at 263-64.
115 See WILLLM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 65-74 (3d ed.

2001) (explaining the duties of agents).
116 This connection between feudal audits and the statutory audit provisions is suggested by A.C. Littleton. See LiTrLETON, supra note 22, at 288-90.
117 The rule in the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844. See 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, § 38
(Eng.). The 1845 Companies Clauses Act further specifies that such auditors must hold at
least one share in the company, but otherwise the), must have no other interest in it (for
example, as officers or directors). See8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 102 (Eng.).
118 See Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 102; Joint Stock Companies
Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, § 38.

20041

The Problem ofAuditor Independence

lish auditor custom of municipalities and manor houses. The 1845
Companies Clauses Act, however, specifically authorized the elected
auditors to hire professional accountants, if they desired, and to
charge the expense to the company.11 9
On this last point, some confusion enters the accounting history
literature. A.C. Littleton, in his early seminal history of accounting,
placed the two parliamentary acts in sequence, with one amending
the other, rather than realizing that the), represent two distinct lineages of legislation (and subject matter). 120 John L. Carey also committed and amplified this error in his later, and equally renowned, history of the American accounting profession, by collapsing the two
statutes into one that he dated to 1845.121 A.C. Littleton also asserted
an "evolution" of auditor qualifications in what he seemed to believe
was a direct lineage of parliamentary acts even beyond the Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1844 and 1845 Companies Clauses Act:
Under the act of 1845 every auditor "shall have at least one
share" and may employ an accountant to assist (Sec. 102);
tinder the act of 1862 the auditors "may be members of the
company" and may employ accountants to assist (table A,
Sec. 86); under the companies act of 1908 no qualification
in regard to stock holding by the auditor vas mentioned and
the item about employing an accountant to assist was omitted. (Sec. 112).122
It seems that A.C. Littleton is suggesting that the evolution was from
traditional English "auditors," who might employ accountants, to professional accountants, who are directly appointed as the sort of auditors we think of toda)y There also seems to be an inference that the
audit role was generalized and weakened over time. It changed from
one that primarily empowered shareholders to examine management
reports, to one that simply had professional accountant/auditors cer119See8

& 9 Vict., c. 16, § 108.

120 LITTLETON,

supra note 22, at 289 ("Within a few months [theJoint Stock Companies Act of 1844] was revised and repassed as 'the companies clauses consolidation act' of
1845.").
121 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 17. John L. Carey's debt to, and reliance on, A.C.
Littleton is acknowledged clearly at the outset of the chapter in which the error occurs. Id.
at 13.
122 LITrLETON, supra note 22, at 293 (alteration in original) (quoting in unnumbered
footnote Company Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 102; The Companies Act, 1862,
25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, tbl.A, § 86 (Eng.); and The Companies Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 12, § 112
(Eng.) respectively).
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tifying company financial statements for the unfocused benefit of the
12 3
entire investing public.
In fact, no such evolution occurred. Instead, the passage of the
1845 Companies Clauses Act had no effect on the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844.124 Thus, the free incorporation lineage of companies statutes began with no requirement for auditors to be shareholders, nor was there an explicit provision for auditors to hire accountants. 125 The only real requirement was that at least one auditor must
be appointed by the shareholders directly.12 6 Of note for later discus-

sion, though, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 also provided
that a government agency, the Commissioners of the Treasury, was
empowered to set the auditor's salar)y as "appear[ed] suitable" to the
Commissioners and that such salary was legally enforceable against
the company.127 Additionally, the auditor's report on management's
mandatory half-yearly presentation of the company's accounts and
balance sheet had to be sent with the latter materials to the government Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. The auditor's report also
128
needed to be available for public inspection at the Registry Office.
Aside from the auditor's reports, however, which were made available
either directly from the company or through the Registry Office,
shareholders had only a qualified right to inspect the company's
books. Further, the company had discretion to mandate the terms of
129
an), inspection.
The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 was amended and repealed 130 over tine through different acts, some of which themselves
123 This -s more clearly the American system that was taking shape just as A.C.
Littleton published his book in 1933, but it ignored the historical and cultural context of
British audits that A.C. Littleton himself worked so hard to establish. See generally
LITrLETON, sutpra note

22.

124 See

Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16 (lacking any mention of repeal
or amendment ofJoint Stock Companies Act of 1844, as was the custom of other repealing
or amending acts in the same era).
125 SeeJoint Stock Companies Act, 1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 110, § 38 (Eng.).
126' Id.
127

12

Id.

8Id. at § 43.
1.9 See id. at § 37. The 1845 Companies Clauses Act has a similar limited right of inspection by shareholders, and further, does not provide for an outside government Registry Office. Of course, a Registry Office is less relevant for statutory companies: because
they can only be created by a Parliamentary act, the government is already fully aware of
each one that comes into existence. See8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, §§ 117, 119.
IS0 The amendment and repeal of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 excepted existing companies registered under it, until they reregistered under the subsequent acts, as
well as existing and to be formed insurance companies. See infra note 133.
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were amended and repealed.' 3' First, it was amended in 1847,132 and
then it was repealed by the Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856 (the "1856
Act"). 133 The new law added a right for one-fifth of shareholders, in
number and value, to request that the government Board of Trade appoint inspectors to examine the affairs of the company,13 which seems
to indicate a concern to give substantial, yet minority subsets of shareholders another avenue to investigate the company beyond the existing
audit rights. It also included, however, a provision for companies to appoint their own inspectors to investigate the company's affairs, in a
manner similar to that used to request Board of Trade inspectors. 135
The resulting separate inspection performed by these inspectors seems
to have replaced the limited direct shareholder inspection rights of the
preNious statute, because the only direct inspection right in the 1856
Act is one reasonably limited by the company and solely for purposes of
inspecting the "Register of Shareholders"-not the general books of
the company'13 6 Both new inspector provisions, however, required
management to produce all books and documents requested by the
inspectors, as well as to answer any question, under oath, posed by the
inspectors on pain of penalties and fines. 137
The 1856 Act also established default audit provisions that were
strengthened in comparison to the original Joint Stock Companies
Act of 1844. Auditors were not expressly required to be shareholders,
but at the same time, auditors could not be interested in any transaction of the company in any manner other than as a shareholder. 3 8
131Some amendments were directed only toward the winding-up provisions of the law
and will not be recounted here.
132 Act to Amend [thejoint Stock Companies Act of 1844], 10 & 11 Vict., c. 78 (1847)
(Eng.). This amending statute did not alter the audit provisions of the joint Stock Companies Act of 1844.
133 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47 (Eng.). TheJoit Stock Companies Act, 1856 also repealed the
1847 amendment. See Act to Amend the joint Stock Companies Acts, 1856 and 1857, 21 &
22 Vict., c. 60 (1858) (Eng.); [Second] Act to Amend theJoint Stock Companies Act, 1856,
20 & 21 Vict., c. 80 (1857) (Eng.); Act to Amend thejoint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 20
& 21 Vict., c. 14 (1857) (Eng.).
134 SeeJoint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47, § 48.
135 See id. at § 51.
1s6 See id. at § 23. Similarly, companies now were required only to register initially with
the Registry Office and then to submit annual "Register of Shareholders," but not the
balance sheets and reports of the company. See id. at § 17. This is possibly because the
specific accounts and reports required in the body of the 1844 statute were now arguably
optional," depending simply on the regulations that the company had adopted, as discussed below. See infra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
137 See id. at §§ 49, 51.
13
See id. at tbl.B, 76.
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Officers and directors were ineligible to be auditors while they remained in those offices. 139 The company had first rights to set the
compensation of the auditors. 140 Auditors explicitly were permitted to
hire accountants at the expense of the company (in line with the 1845
Companies Clauses Act),141 and had express powers to "examine"

officers and directors. 42 Of particular note, the 1856 Act also
specifically set forth what be thought of as the core definition of the
modern professional audit:
The auditors shall make a Report to the Shareholders upon
the Balance Sheet and Accounts, and in every such Report
they shall state whether, in their Opinion, the Balance Sheet
is a fill and fair Balance Sheet, containing the Particulars
required by these Regulations, and properly drawn up so as
to exhibit a true and correct View of the State of the Company's Affairs, and in case they have called for Explanations
or Information from the Directors, whether such Explanations or Information have been given by the Directors, and
whether they have been satisfactory; and such Report shall
be read, together with the Report of the Directors, at the
43
Ordinary Meeting.
Companies were free, however, to adopt modified versions of any of
the default "Regulations for Management of the Company" included
as Table B of the 1856 Act. 144 If they adopted no regulations, then the
default rules were considered binding on the company.145 It is unclear
whether a company could adopt regulations that completely ignored
specific provisions of the default rules-for example, the audit provisions--or regulations that represented such watered-down provisions
as to vitiate any practical import. Further, a company's regulations al146
ways could be modified by special resolution of the shareholders,
and the belief may have been that shareholders who wanted audit
provisions in place would get them through a special resolution if
they were not already part of the company's regulations.
139 SeeJoint

Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict., c. 47, tbl.B,
78, 81.
See id. at tbl.B,
141 See id. at tbl.B, 1 83
142 See id.
143 Id. at tbl.B, 84.
144 SeeJoint Stock Companies Act, 1856, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, § 9.
145See id.
146See id. at §§ 33-36.
140

76.
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The following year, the 1856 Act was amended first by The Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1857,147 and then further by An Act to Amend
"The Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856."148 Neither one of these
amendments modified the existing audit provisions. 149 The 1856 Act

was later amended once more, 15 0 with no changes to the audit provisions, before itself being repealed in 1862.151
The Companies Act, 1862 (the "1862 Act") repealed the Joint
Stock Companies Act, 1856, and its progen). 15 2 It also repealed or
amended a number of other statutes, effectively bringing together all
of the laws governing both regular "trading" joint stock companies
and banking companies, the only exceptions being charter and statutory companies. In dropping the 'joint" part of the previous statute
names, it also signified a move towards the modern use of the unmodified term "company" to include joint, fixed stock firms. The
statute preserved the right of shareholders to request an examination
of the affairs of the company by inspectors from the Board of Trade,
or by their own inspectors. 153 It also retained the provisions for a
"Register of Members" 15 4 which had to be available to shareholders at
the company's office and submitted to the government Registry
Office for inspection by the general public. 155 Further, shareholders
still could amend the regulations of the company by special resolu56
tion.1
The default audit provisions of the Joint Stock Companies Act,
1856, persisted as well, with minor alterations. Auditors now were
charged expressly with performing an audit once a year 15 7 and the
company was to set compensation at-large in general meeting. 58 The
1862 Act also provided an interesting first suggestion of an "audit
147 20 & 21 Vict., c. 14 (Eng.).

148 20 & 21 Vict., c. 80 (1857) (Eng.).
149 As a side note, the original Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 remained in force
throughout this period for companies that had been formed under it before repeal, as well
as for insurance companies either existing or to be-formed. See id. at § 1.
150 SecTheJoint Stock Companies Amendment Act, 1858, 21 & 22 Vict., c. 60 (Eng.).
151 SeeThe Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 (Eng.).
152 See id. at § 4, sched. 3, pt. 1. This Schedule provides an excellent listing of the prior
acts amended or repealed by The Companies Act, 1862. hsurance companies were also
required to register under and in accordance with the provisions of this law. See id. at § 209.
153 See id. at §§ 56-60.
154 In the various companies acts, there is a certain interchangeability of the terms
member" and "shareholder."
155 See id. at §§ 25-26, 32.
156 See id. at §§ 50-51, 53-54.
157 Sec The Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89, sched. 1,
83-94.
158 See id.
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committee"-although of course not composed of directors or officers,
nor a committee of the board of directors-in a model "Memorandum
of Association" given as an attachment to the statute.1 59 This memorandum suggested that the audit committee normally would be nominated
by the members-that is, shareholders-of the company at the annual
160
meeting, and have all the powers of the auditors under the statute.
There followed a long succession of amending acts, few of which
had a substantial effect on the audit provisions that were now well established for stock companies. 161 Much of this amending history was
based on attempts to limit the "illegitimate or fraudulent practices on
the part of unscrupulous persons" who exploited the limited liability
system introduced by the 1862 Act. 62 At the same time, it was claimed
to be "obvious to everyone of what value and importance the limited
liability system has been and is to the commercial prosperity of the
country."163 Indeed, by 1907, there were 40,000 companies operating
under the various free incorporation companies acts with a total of
£2,000,000,000 invested in them. 164 Thus, the number of free incorporation companies already far outstripped the numbers of either
charter companies or statute companies. Accordingly, the free incorporation system encompassed the lion's share of incorporated busi59 Sec id. at § 29, sched. 2, frm. B.
See id. at §§ 29-34, sched. 2, frm. B.
161Other acts were passed to amend The Companies Act, 1862, directly, but they are of
limited relevance here otherwise. See The Companies Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 12 (Eng.)
(permitting companies incorporated in British possessions to own land); The Companies
Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 26 (Eng.) (empowering courts to enforce various provisions of
the collected companies acts); The Companies (Winding up) Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c.
58 (Eng.) (amending further winding up procedures); The Companies (Winding up) Act,
1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 63 (Eng.) (specifying winding up procedures); The Companies
(Memorandum of Association) Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 62 (Eng.) (allowing companies
to modify their memorandum of association, or other incorporating document, by special
resolution); The Companies Act, 1886, 49 Vict., c. 23 (Eng.) (providing for liquidation
procedures for companies in Scotland); The Companies (Colonial Registers) Act, 1883, 46
& 47 Vict., c. 30 (Eng.) (permitting companies incorporated in British colonies to keep
local registers of members); The Companies Act, 1880, 43 Vict., c. 19 (Eng.) (permitting
distributions of accumulated capital to shareholders on certain conditions and establishing
power of the Registrar of Companies to remove names of defunct companies from the
Registry); The Companies Act, 1877, 40 & 41 Vict., c. 26 (Eng.) (clarifying that "capital"
includes "paid tip capital" and that companies can reduce the same); The Joint Stock
Companies Arrangements Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 104 (Eng.) (specifying conditions on
winding up arrangements between creditors and shareholders); An Act to Amend The
Companies Act, 1862, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 47 (1867) (Eng.) (later known as "The Companies
Act, 1867") (sinplifving settlement of company debts to the Crown).
162 2 CHI-Y'S STATUTES OF PRACTICAL UTILrrY 531 n.(q) (W.H. Aggs ed., 6th ed. 1911).
160

163 Id.
164

Id. (citing Lord Granard, House of Lords (Mar. 14, 1907)).
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ness enterprise in England and could not be disassembled practically
at that late date.
A few amendments of The Companies Act, 1862, are worth noting, however. The Companies Act, 1879,165 removed an) ambiguity
about requirements for both auditors and all annual audit, at least for
banking companies, by adopting the now standard audit provisions of
the default regulations of previous acts. 166 The 1879 Act also instituted
a new requirement-again only for banking companies-that the balance sheets submitted to shareholders as part of the annual, or other,
meetings be signed by the auditors, as well as the directors of the
167
company.
A clear precursor to the liabilities, and defenses, of company directors pursuant to untrue statements made in stock prospectuses that
appear in the '33 Act was set out in the Directors Liability Act, 1890.168
Of note here, is the provision that allowed directors to defend such
claims based on good faith reliance on the expert reports of others,
such as accountants. 169
The turn of the century brought a major change regarding audits
and auditors to the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898,170 illthe form of
the Companies Act, 1900 (the "1900 Act"). 171 The new law removed
the ambiguity about audits brought on by the placement of the rele16 42 & 43 Vict., c. 76 (Eng.).
6
1 6 See id. at § 7.
167 See

id. at § 8. Note that this is different from requiring auditors to sign their own re-

ports.
16 53 & 54 Vict., c. 64 (Eng.).
169

Id. at § 3(1) (b). This prescient provision reads as follows:

With respect to every such untrue statement purporting to be a statement by
or contained in what purports to be a copy of or extract from a report or
valuation of an engineer, valuer, accountant, or other expert, that it fairly
represented the statement made by such engineer, valuer, accountant, or
other expert, or was a correct and fair copy of or extract from the report or
valuation. Provided always, that notwithstanding that such untrue statement
fairly represented the statement made by such an engineer, valuer, accountant, or other expert, or w-as a correct and fair copy of an extract from the report or valuation, such director, person named, promote, or other person,
who authorised the issue of the prospectus or notice as aforesaid, shall be liable to pay compensation as aforesaid if it be proved that he had no reasonable ground to believe that the person making the statement, report, or
valuation ,as competent to make it ....
Id.
170 This is the convention set out in the various amending acts themselves. See. e.g.,
Companies Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 36 (Eng.).
171 63 & 64 Vict., c. 48.
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rant provisions in the "optional" default regulations of Table B in the
1862 Act, by reinserting them in the body of the new statute. 172 This
development extended the trend of requiring audits, which started in
the Companies Act, 1879, for banking companies, to all companies
covered by the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898.
Of note, these audit provisions continued the practice of the "optional" default audit provisions of earlier acts in which the only
qualification for auditors was that they could not also serve as officers
or directors of the company.1.73 Remuneration and appointment of
auditors remained generally the sole province of the company acting 1in74
general meeting-that is, full shareholder participation and voting.
The auditors continued to have rights of access at all times to the
books, accounts, and vouchers of the company, as well as the right to
175
require information and explanations from directors and officers.
Their mode of reporting was altered, however, because aside from the
regular reports on the accounts examined, the auditors were to "sign a
certificate at the foot of the balance sheet stating whether or not all
their requirements as auditors have been complied with."' 76 Finall;
more references to auditors began appearing in other parts of the sections of the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1898, including those in the 1900
Act, suggesting an expanding formal role for auditors. In particular, the
1900 Act included a provision mandating that prospectuses include the
names and addresses of the company's auditors, 177 and that the report
contain a capitalifrom the initial "statutory meeting" of the company
178
zation section certified as correct by the auditors.
One final relevant amending act rounds out the history of the
Companies Acts, 1862 to 1900-the Companies Act, 1907 (the "1907
Act").179 The new law primarily concerned the issuances of prospectuses, and included a requirement that a prescribed "Statement in
Lieu of Prospectus" be filed with the Registrar of Companies if no

172

See id.at §§ 21-23.

173See id. at § 21(3). That is, of course, auditors could only serve as officers of the

company by virtue of being auditors; they could not occupy other officer positions.
174 See id. at § 21. The directors can appoint the initial auditors and fill any casual vaIn addition, they can set remuneration in the foregoing situations.
cancies.
75
1 See id.at § 23.
17663 & 64 Vict., c. 48, § 23.
177See id. at § 10(1) (1).
178 See id. at § 12(3). The "statutory meeting" appears akin to the organizational meeting required of most new corporations in U.S. state corporation laws.
1797 Edw. 7, c. 50, §§ 1-52 (Eng.).
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prospectus was used in connection with the sale of stock. 8 0 The 1907
Act also included a revision of the now mandatory audit provisions of
the 1900 Act. In particular, the audit section was revised to require
that (1) either the auditor's report be directly attached to an), balance
sheet submitted to the shareholders in general meeting, or a reference to the report must be included at the foot of the balance sheet;
(2) the auditor's report had to be read before the company in general
meeting and to be open to inspection by any shareholder, including a
right to copies for nominal charge; (3) anyone, other than a retiring
auditor, who was to be nominated for appointment as auditor at the
general meeting must be nominated by a shareholder who discloses
such intention to nominate the individual a prescribed period before
the meeting; and, (4) when any copies of balance sheets were issued,
circulated, or published without being signed by the directors and
including the auditor's report or reference thereto, the persons responsible for such act could be fined up to fifty pounds.' 8 '
The new law also required companies that had to submit annual
reports to the Registry Office with summaries of financial activities
under the Companies Acts, 1862 to 1900, to include a balance sheet
audited by the company's auditors. 18 2 This clearly anticipated the later
annual statutory audit required under rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") under the '34 Act. It
also represented an interesting step forward in the British system for
auditor's reports possibly to be used, and to be relied on, by persons
other than management and shareholders of the company.
When the accretion of amending statute upon statute had become too labyrinthian, however, Parliament once again repealed the
whole lot and replaced it with the Companies (Consolidation) Act,
1908.18 This Act preserved the two important protections of inspection by the Board of Trade on request of a subset of shareholders1 84
and annual audits by auditors who could not be officers or directors
of the compan); and who must be appointed by the company-at-large
in the annual meeting. 85 Auditors retained their powers of access to

18

See id. at §§ 1-3.
181See id. at § 19.
1' See id. at § 21.
183 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, §§ 1-296 (Eng.).
i8 See id. at § 109.
15 Seeid. at§§ 112-113.
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documents and management and their rights to issue reports accessi86
ble to shareholders.
Further, the requirements to file an annual register of members,
as well as an audited balance sheet, with the Registry Office continued
in force. 187 The register also had to be kept at the registered office of
the company and had to be made available for inspection by both
shareholders (gratis) and the general public (for no more than one
shilling).188 Copies of the annual report and the register needed to be
made available on request by either shareholders or members of the
public for no more than sixpence per hundred words. 8 9
The company and its officers could incur liability for not making
the register and annual report available pursuant to the foregoing
requirements,19 but it is not clear whether the audited balance sheet
was "relied on" by members of the public enough to create any liability issues for the auditors. A provision of the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, however, established liability in certain instances:
[When] an), person in any return, report, certificate, balance
sheet, or other document, required by or for the purpose of
any of the provisions of this Act specified in the Fifth Schedule hereto, wilfully [sic] makes a statement false in any material particular, knowing it to be false, he shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor .... 191
Finall); this lineage of companies acts metamorphosed through
one more set of amendments before again being repealed and reconsolidated into the Companies Act, 1929, which would, in turn, be the
direct template for the '33 Act in the United States. 19 2 In particular, the
Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, would be amended by the
Companies Act, 1913; 193 the Companies (Particulars as to Directors)
Act, 1917;194 and the Companies Act, 1928 (the "1928 Act"). 195 The last
of these, however, would never become effective because the Companies Act, 1929, was passed before many of the 1928 Act's provisions
186

Id. at § 113,

1-4.

187 See id. at § 26,

3.
188 See Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, § 30,
189 See id. at § 30, 2.
190 See id. at § 26, 5 & § 30, 3.
191Id. at § 281.
192 See infra notes 311-444 and accompanying text.
193 3 & 4 Geo. 5, c. 25 (Eng.).
194 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 28 (Eng.).
195 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 45 (Eng.).

11

(Eng.).
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were implemented; therefore, much of 1928 Act vas either repealed or
restated in the Companies Act, 1929.196
For the purposes of this Article, though, it is only the new material
included in the final consolidation of the 1928 Act and the Companies
Act, 1929, that advances the audit story in a curious way. Of central importance for this story, and with little explanation, the Companies Act,
1929, brought into force a new provision of the 1928 Act that required
an auditor's report on the profits of the company for the preceding
three years to be part of any prospectus used to sell stock. 197 This report
also would set out the rates of dividends, if any, paid on each class of
shares in each of the three years covered. 198 Additionally, where any
proceeds of the securities offering would be used to purchase another
business, a report by accountants-to be named in the prospectuscovering the profits of that business for the preceding three years also
had to be included. 199 This unassuming change to a schedule to the
1928 Act ftrthered the new trend for British company audits to be
used, and relied on, by others outside of the company's management
and shareholders.
Aside from this new audit requirement for prospectuses, though,
the Companies Act, 1929, did not add much to the story' Directors and
other officers, in certain circumstances, could still rely on accountant's
reports in liability actions based on untrue statements in prospectuses. 200 The register of members vas no longer required to be submitted annually to the Registry Office, but it had to be indexed and updated and available to a prescribed minimum extent to shareholders
and members of the public at the company's registered office. 2 1 Al
annual return, however, was still required to be filed with the Registry
Office, as well as made available by the company in the same manner as
the register.20 2 This return also had to include a list of shareholders as
well as the last audited balance sheet, together with its auditor's re-

196 See 26 CHTIrrr's STATUTES OF PRACTICAL UTILITY 553 (Theodore John Sophian
ed., 1929).
197 See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, sched. IV, pt. II (Eng.). This provision ,as derived from the Companies Act, 1928. See 18 & 19 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 33. The general provisions for the prospectuses themselves are set out at sections 34 through 38 of the
Companies Act, 1928. Id. §§ 33-38.
198 See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, sched. IM pt. II.

199 See id.
200 See id. § 37(1) (d). Accountants are "experts" per section 37(4). Id. § 37(4).

201See id. §§ 97-98.
202
See id. §§ 108-111.
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port.20 3 Newly formed companies still had to hold a "statutory meeting"
and issue a "statutory report," certified by the company's auditors20 to
4
members, as well as file a copy of the report with the Registry Office. 2 0 5
Likewise, the standard auditor provisions were fully retained,
except that the disqualifications as to eligibility to act as an auditor
were extended beyond officers and directors of the company to encompass (1) persons who are partners or employees of an officer of
the company and (2) any corporation. 20 6 There were also extra calls
for use of auditors' reports, such as in the case of holding and subsidiary companies, 20 7 and a requirement that auditors must disclose
the particulars of any case in which the accounts they had been exam208
ining were not kept in accordance with the provisions of the Act. InI
a new development, however, auditors were included expressly in a
provision limiting so-called "willful default" clauses that indemnify or
exempt directors and officers from liability that might otherwise attach under the law-regardless of whether the auditors were consid20 9
ered officers of the company by virtue of their positions.
Additionally, in the now well established manner, balance sheets
presented by management had to have auditor's reports attached, and
the auditor's reports needed to be read at the general meeting and
made available for inspection by shareholders. 210 Improperly executed
balance sheets, or balance sheets without auditor's reports, that were
distributed, continued to lead to liability for the knowing distributors. 211 The rights of members to receive balance sheets, and auditor's
reports attached thereto, however, were extended. For example, the
Act required auditors to send these materials to shareholders in advance of meetings and to furnish the same upon demand, even to
21 2
shareholders who might not otherwise have a right to them.
The provisions for inspectors from the Board of Trade were retained, but were strengthened, including subsequent court actions
that may be premised on their findings. The provisions also were bal203SeeCompanies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 108, 110.
2 4

0 See id. § 113.

05 See id. §§ 132-134.
20

6 See id. § 133.
See id. § 126(2).
208See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 128(4).
209 See id. § 152. The auditor, as an officer, also might be subjected to the extra penalties for officers acting in default of provisions of the Act. See id. § 365.
210See id. § 129.
211Sce id.
212See id. § 130.
207

2004]

The Problem of Auditor Independence

anced by inquiry and security requirements of those calling for such
inspection to minimize bad faith requests.

213

Similarl, companies re-

tained the ability to appoint their own inspectors by special resolution, with similar rights and obligations of those appointed by the
214
Board of Trade.
In sum, the Companies Act, 1929, continued the established
framework for the audit and auditor requirements, while consolidating a trend of gradual, incremental expansion of audit report use.
The primary thrust of the system, however, was still to pro-tide shareholders an organized mechanism that the), could control to monitor
directors' and officers' management of the company. Before turning
to summarize the overall state and context of auditors and audits in
the British system-up to that system's pronounced influence on the
drafting and passage of the '33 Act in the United States-it is important to tie up some loose ends. This will be done by briefly tracing the
less convoluted paths of audit provisions in the lineages of acts governing statutory companies and charter companies. 215
To begin, the Companies Clauses Act, 1845 (the "1845 Act"), governing statutory companies, is still valid law.216 It has been amended,
but not fully repealed. The Companies Clauses Act, 1863, was the first
amendment, but it mainly concerns modifications of the capitalization
proisions. 217 Next, the Companies Clauses Act, 1869, modified provi-

sions regarding debentures.

218

The amending acts were consolidated in

the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1888 (the "1888 Act"), 219

which led to the full law as to statutory companies distributed between
the original 1845 Act and the 1888 Act, all of which is cited as the
Companies Clauses Consolidation Acts, 1845 and 1888.220 The 1888 Act
itself only modifies proxisions regarding proxy voting. Finally, the Statu-

tory Companies (Redeemable Stock) Act, 1915, permitted statutory
companies to authorize and to issue redeemable preference and debenture stock. 221 Accordingly, essentially all of the law regarding statutory companies was set out among the Companies Clauses Act, 1845,
the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1888, and the Statutory
213

See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, §§ 135-136.

214 See id. § 137.
215 Sce infra notes 216-236 and accompanying text.
216 See 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16 (Eng.); see also 8 HALSBURY'S STATUTES,
217 26
218 32

& 27 Vict., c. 118 (Eng.).

& 33 Vict., c. 48 (Eng.).
& 52 Vict., c. 48 (Eng.).
220 See id. § 1.
221 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 44 (Eng.).
219 51

supra note 52, at 8.
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Companies (Redeemable Stock) Act, 1915-especially when considering it at the time of passage of the '33 Act in the United States.
The audit and auditor provisions in this lineage were contained in
the 1845 Act, as discussed briefly above. These provisions may be
amended or disregarded, however, when the specific parliamentary act
that created the company did so expressly. Thus, to some extent, all of
the Companies Clauses Consolidated Acts, 1845 and 1888, are default
rules.

222

To expand on the brief sketch of audit provisions above, the

following are the "default" requirements for statutory companies:
auditors must be elected by the shareholders in the same manner as
directors;

223

there must be two auditors unless the shareholders vote

otherwise; 224 auditors must hold at least one share in the company, but
they may not hold any other office in the company, nor have any other
interest in the company other than as a shareholder; 225 one auditor in
any given year must rotate out of office, but can be re-elected as a
"new" auditor immediately; 226 auditors must receive and examine the
half-yearly reports of the directors; 227 auditors may employ accountants at the expense of the company; 228 and auditors can either make a
special report on their examination of the half-yearly directors' reports, or simply confirm the directors' reports, with such report or
22 9
confirmation to be read at the general meeting.
Other important provisions not related specifically to audits or
auditors include the following: a "Shareholder Address Book" must be
kept and made available to shareholders, but not the general public,
in the same manner as the Register of Members for joint stock companies; 230 general meetings must be held half-yearly; 231 officers are
specifically liable to account for their use of company monies, with
specific penalties, including possible criminal charges, for non-

See 51 & 52 Vict., c. 48, § 1.
See Companies Clauses Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 101 (Eng.). This is more
specific than the "appointment of auditors" by "general meeting" in the Companies Acts.
224 See id.
225 See id. § 102.
226 See id. § 103. Of course, this seems a little formalistic, with little practical safeguarding benefit.
227 See id. § 107. And, the directors are obliged to deliver the same to them. See id. at
222

223

§ 106.

22

8 See8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, § 108.

229
230

See id.
See id. This is in addition to a Registry of Shareholders, but that registry is not re-

quired to be available to shareholders in the same manner. See id. at § 9.
231 See id. § 66.
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compliance; 232 and accounts must be kept, and books balanced, with
shareholders given limited rights to see evidence of the sane. 233

For chartered companies, the lineage of statutes is even briefer.
The original Chartered Companies Act, 1837,234 was amended only by
the Chartered Companies Act, 1884,235 before both were repealed by

the Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993.236 At the time of the '33 Act,
however, both were still in force. For our purposes, neither act is particularly instructive, as they say little about audits or auditors as discussed above.
It is clear that the audit custom and office in British companies
and law developed largely without formal reference to accountants,
chartered or otherwise. Instead, they were rooted in a centuries old
tradition of directly delegated agency to trusted individuals who would
look after their principals' interests as against other agents of those
principals. As explained below, the entire Companies Acts system was
admired enough by Congress and the drafters of the '33 Act (and '34
Act) to be followed closely) Much of what was good in the Companies
Acts, however, may well have stemmed from a top-down coherency allowed by the aggregation in one place of the law relating to corporations, securities regulation, and bankruptcy (insofar as related to rules
governing the winding up of companies). Further, to the extent that
accountants were employed-directly or indirectly-as auditors, they
vere also likely to be chartered accountants, who were themselves licensed, regulated, and associated professionally under one authority.
The real beauty of the British audit system, however, is that it existed as a stand alone office of the company, beholden only to share-

holders as a watchdog for their interests. Audits were not done by a
company's auditors for the use of third parties, such as creditors. Instead, as outlined above, British creditors tended to employ their own
232 See id. §§ 109-114. This sounds like the old "charge and discharge" system, but with
the directors acting as "auditors."
233 See8 & 9 Vict., c. 16, §§ 115-119.
234 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 73 (Eng.).
235 47 & 48 Vict., c. 56 (Eng.) (granting power to Crown to renew terms of chartered
companies).
236 Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993, c. 50 (Eng.), available at http://wvw.himso.gov.uk/
acts/acts1993/Ukpga 19930050 en 1.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); see also 8 HALSBURv'S
STATUTES, supra note 52, at 8. Even after the repeal of the Chartered Companies Act, 1837,
and the Chartered Companies Act, 1884, however, the Queen still retained the power to
grant charters of incorporation of limited duration and to extend or renew such charters,
or the privileges granted by such, a charter. Statute Law (Repeals) Act, 1993, c. 50, § 11,
sched. 2.
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auditors to check up on their investments at home or abroad. When a
company was being liquidated, the Board of Trade also could call for
an audit of the accounts of the liquidator, but there is no indication
that such audit would be done by the company's auditor, nor that any
reliance would be given on the company's auditors' reports or
certificates. 237 Most important, there was no sense that a company's
auditors were acting on behalf of the general public, or even on behalf
of that subset which might be deemed the "investing public." This was
because of the formal disconnect between the company office of "auditor" and the separate profession of accountants, chartered or othervise. Thus, in the British system in place at the time of the passage of
the '33 Act, auditors occupied a unique position as quasi-insiderstechnically officers of the company-but also as elected agents or
watchdogs for the existing shareholders. The auditor's role was essentially a "private" one, in that it was exclusively on behalf of the hiring
party the shareholders.
Chartered accountants, however, who performed audit services
directly or indirectly as a company's auditors, might have felt a professional sense of duty to the general public in providing their services.
Their primary duty, however, was still to their client-whether that
client was the elected auditor of the company, or the shareholders of
the company (in the case where the chartered accountant was directly
elected as auditor). For that matter, chartered accountants were often
hired to play other roles such as liquidator or receiver in the British
system, but again, their role in those cases was not as a chartered accountant per se, but instead as that officer and in accordance with
that officer's rights and obligations as set out in the various Compa2 38
nies Acts.
In this regulatory environment, then, a true reputation marketplace for accounting and audit services could flourish. Chartered accountants picked up engagements as auditors, liquidators, or receivers
for companies, creditors, or government agencies-or as professional
"subcontractors" for others who filled those roles-based on their reputations as trustworthy and competent agents for their hiring principals,
including, obviousl), their facility with accounting. They were not
conflicted in these engagements by being required to act for two or
more principals on the same matter. Thus, no "auditor independence"

237See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 195 (Eng.).
238 See LITTLETON, supra note 22, at 279-80.
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rules developed or vere needed in the British system existing at the
time of passage of the '33 Act (or '34 Act) in the United States.
II.

THE QUEST FOR PROFESSIONAL RECOGNITION

Across the Atlantic, however, both auditing and accounting were
proceeding quite differently. The United States appears to have had
fewer worries about "free incorporation," so state statutes allowing the
formation of corporations simply upon registration cropped up earlier than the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 in Great Britain.239
The result, however, was numerous different corporation laws with
little uniformity across the United States. 240 Further, these were relatively bare bones laws that centered on registration requirements and
formalities. 241 There were no audit provisions, nor for that matter,
very many provisions for the protection of shareholders generally. 242
Of relevance here, too, may be the timing of the development of

corporations law in the United States. The American Revolution occurred during the period that the Bubble Act was in effect throughout the British Empire. Thus, the fledgling United States grew out of
a background in which virtually no companies were allowed. 243 At the
same time, there wvas no longer an), Crown to charter companies-the
only way to establish companies under the Bubble Act. Thus, the only
other logical counterpart to a British authority with the power to create companies would have been Congress. The history of the states as
separate colonies, however, perhaps originally linked nore tightly to
Parliament and the Crown than to each other, coupled with the subsequent chaotic period of the Revolution and the hesitant steps from
loose federation to republic through the War of 1812, lay have further entrenched the development of corporations law as a state,
rather than a federal matter. Additionally the notion of central control of a basic, usually locally operating, commercial vehicle such as
the corporation may have been exactly.the sort of thing that smacked
of the overbearing control of Parliament and the Crown, which the

239
240

See, e.g., supra note 44 (describing New York state statute).
See, e.g., BUREAU OF CORPS., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE &

COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS 39-40 (1904).
241 See infra notes 311-347 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 311-347 and accompan)ing text.
243 See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
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new United States had revolted against, and so instead properly fell to
244
the powers reserved to the states under the U.S. Constitution.
At the same time, the widely distributed wealth of the new country-largely spread out among the small family farms that accounted
for ninety-five percent of the population 245-likely reduced the need
for an audit tradition similar to that of the great English manors.
Similarl), the direct democracies of small town governments in the
colonies, later states, and their relatively uncomplicated financial record keeping, 246 may also have reduced the demand for audits of local
government officials.
The foregoing, compounded with the later development of industrialization in the United States than in Great Britain, resulted in a
slower development of the accounting profession and a largely absent
tradition of auditing up until the mid-1800s.

247

Thus, when industri-

alization was well underway in the United States by the mid-1800s, the
nascent accounting profession was as decentralized and variable as
the corporations laws. 248 With no real professional bod

and no li-

censing requirements to attest to competency, the profession likely
was perceived as composed of "mere" bookkeepers of limited usefulness. Yet, as they had done in England, the developing industrial
businesses and railroads necessitated accounting and audit services, as
249
much as the ensuing speculative booms and busts did.
Even in the late 1800s, however, as the transformation of the
United States from an agrarian economy to an industrial one was
nearing completion, the disaggregated profession was unable to
achieve the same level of stature as its chartered counterparts in England and Scotland-whose members indeed were even then "invad244See, e.g., INDUS. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 645 (1902). In 1902, the federal Industrial
Commission stated the following:
It has long been considered a fundamental principle of our Government that
the States should retain a considerable proportion of the legal supervision of
business. In the main, at the present time, the v-arious civil rights of our citizens,
including those rights which come under the law of contracts, are in the hands
of the separate States. [A change in this status quo], while it may eventually be
necessar, would prove centralizing to a degree to most people unthought of, in
connection with our form of government.
Id.
245 See GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS iMERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY
IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING

246 See id. at 60.

247See supra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
248See supra notes 22-105 and accompanying text.
249 See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 245, at 66-73, 81-91.

33-34 (1998).
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ing" the United States to monitor substantial investments by British
syndicates. 250 Thus, from the long-awaited creation of the first American accountants' society in 1887, through the passage of the first CPA
law in 1896, to the passage of the '33 Act, a defining goal of accountants was arguably their status as members of a true profession. 251 Nevertheless, the vagaries and inconsistencies of different state CPA laws
worked against any sort of national reliance on accountants based on
uniform minimum standards, such as existed for the English and
Scottish chartered accountants. Additionall), few if any laws, state or
federal, enshrined a role that seemed as custom built for accountants
as the British Companies Acts did, at least indirectly.
The only element that American accountants could control was
their association as a profession-and this the), did by creating a "national" organization called the American Association of Public Accountants in 1887.252 The organization grew slowly, however, and was

comprised primarily of New York accountants through its first years. 253
By 1904, accountants seemed as likely to be members of local societies
as members of the "national" organization. Many of these local societies grew up as associations for newly minted CPAs under recent CPA
laws. 25 4 In fact, these local societies were numerous and substantial

enough to create their own "Federation of Societies of Public Accountants in the United States of America."25 5 A s the confusion
reached a peak over the primacy of these accounting organizations, as
well as membership requirements-for example, could all accountants or only CPAs join?-the first International Congress of Accountants was held that year in St. Louis.

25 6

The International Congress

provided a "rallying point" for American accountants, who then managed to merge or disperse their various professional associations such
that the American Association of Public Accountants could lay claim
as "the" association of the profession. 25 7
The profession, however, still sought to burnish its image to the
general public, to elevate itself above "mere bookkeepers," and to
See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
See CAREY, supra note 23, at 45-46.
252 See id. at 36-38. This group is one of the precursors to the AICPA. Ironically, it
as
largely started by a transplanted English chartered accountant. See id.; see also Ami. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 71.
253 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 39-40, 49.
254 See id. at 49-52; see also supra notes 73-81.
255 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 49.
256 See id. at 49-52.
257 See id.
20o

251
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take on weightier public service roles. 258 In short, it wanted to be
viewed as a prestigious learned profession such as law or medicine.
Scottish
The seeming attainment of this status by the English and 259
tantalizing.
more
the
all
chartered accountants made this goal
Opportunities to achieve this goal finally arose in the first two
decades of the twentieth century. First, some major companies, such
as the U.S. Steel Corporation and the American Tobacco Company,
began experimenting with public disclosure of audits that they already were having done for other internal or shareholder purposes.
Such public disclosure led to an increase in auditing work, generally
in the guise of a new "best practice" for major companies. 260 Second,
auditors increasingly found their work commissioned by corporate
clients, or others, in connection with credit facilities, investments, or
investigations that involved a corporation. 261 Third, and most substantiall) the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu26 2
expressly permitted Congress to institute an income taxtion
which it did 263-and dramatically increased the need for the services
2M
of accountants, as many of them had accurately predicted.
Public disclosure of corporate finances and governance also may
have been a preemptive response to increased calls for such disclosure-termed "publicity" in the jargon of the time 265-regarding the
inner workings of the powerful trusts that had come to dominate the
economic landscape. At the height of the "trust busting" era at the
turn of the century, the Final Report of the federal Industrial Commission called for inter alia (1) disclosure and anti-fraud measures related to the offering or sale of stock to the public; (2) disclosure of
the nature of the business, and the powers and limitations of the directors and officers, of the publicly traded company in its certificate
of incorporation, which must then be available for public inspection;
(3) annual detailed financial reports to members or shareholders,
See id. at 45-46. One leading accountant from the time is quoted as frequently
quipping that "[t]he public thinks a public accountant is a bookkeeper out of ajob-who
drinks." Id. at 46.
259 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
260 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 57-58, 83-84.
261 See id. at 77; LIITETON, supra note 22, at 298. In contrast, British audits rarely were
relied upon by third parties as discussed above. See supra notes 106-237 and accompanying
28

text.

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Tariff of 1913 (Underwood Tariff Act), Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
264 See CAREY, supra note 23, at 67-71.
265 See infia note 316 and accompanying text.
262
263
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"verified by a competent auditor"; and (4) publication of annual, detailed financial reports, "properly audited" tinder oath and subject to
266
government inspection.
One member of the Industrial Commission, Tholnas W. Phillips,
was allowed to append a statement that went even further in its recommendations. His proposal would have pushed states to adopt uniform state corporation laws that inter alia would establish "a rigid system of public accounting" 267 that would operate in two complementary ways:
First, each corporation should be required to make periodical reports of its business, supplemented by other reports
upon official demand, all verified by oaths of certain of its
officers. Second, official examiners should also be maintained, who should, at irregular periods and without notice,
appear at the offices of each corporation and make rigid examination of its affairs, using its books in the first instance,
but verifying the correctness thereof by every practicable
method. The reports of this official should be made to a su2 68
pervising official, and by him duly made public.
Phillips pointed out that similar systems were already put in place by
the federal government for banking concerns and manufactures of
certain items on which the government levied internal taxes. 269
Under his proposal, the annual reports would be made to an
officer designated as the auditor and would contain information
largely in accordance with that required under various reporting provisions of the British Companies Acts as discussed above.2 70 The auditor would prescribe the form of the reports and could call for additional reports. As to the level of scrutiny authorized, "No detail of the
business of the corporation shall be considered private so as to be ex266INDUS. CONsMf'N, supra note 244, at 649-650 (including recommendations from preliminary report in final report).
267 By "public accounting" Thomas W. Phillips appears simply to mean an "accounting
to the public" on the part of the compan)y not the practice of being a public accountant as
described supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
266 INDUS. CONIM'N, supra note 244, at 669.
269 See id.
270 See id. at 670. Thomas W Phillips does not state explicitly whether these provisions

intentionally followed many of the British precedents, nor whether the "auditor" should be
an accountant. See id. Likely, he deems this a permissive, rather than mandatory, aspect of
the system, as he also provides for "expert accountants" to act as examiners subordinate to
the auditor. See id. At the same time, however, the auditor can also play the role of an examiner at the auditor's own discretion, as discussed below. Id. at 671.
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empt from the examination of the auditor, whenever he may demand
report thereon. '"271 Most important, the auditor would make such reports public, including a requirement that the final auditor approved
version would be published by the company in a newspaper in accor272
dance with regular custom for publication of corporate notices.
Appropriate penalties for corporations who attempted to evade or
273
frustrate this reporting system also would be included.
For "surprise" examinations, "expert accountants" 274 would be
provided for and, under the direction of the auditor, appear without
notice and examine the books, property, records, and papers of the
corporation. 275 These examiners also would "have the power to examine under oath all officers or employees of the corporation, or an,
other person having an, knowledge of its affairs"-all enforceable by
appropriate court action. 276 Auditors themselves could also act as examiners at their sole discretion. 277 But examiners could not inspect
any business if they were "interested in the business thereof, or of any
competing concern, or [if they had] relatives who are so interested."278

It is not clear whether these auditors and examiners would be
government employees, or even contractors, or whether they would
instead be separate individuals or firms that then would be hired by
stock companies to satisfy legal requirements (analogous to the contemporary statutory audit system). Further, the remuneration mechanism is not clearly specified.

Nonetheless, these proposals must have been terrifying to corporations big and small. Thus, in accordance with a well-worn pattern,
the biggest, most notorious companies and trusts likely felt it was in
their best interest to begin disclosing information on their own terms,
rather than wait for state or federal regulation. Accordingly whether
evidencing a causal relationship or not, a number of these companies,
including those mentioned above, began commissioning audits by ex279
ternal CPAs with the results made publicly available.
-71Id. at 671.
272

See id.

supra note 244, at 671.
"certified public accountants" were not included-likely because not
all states had passed CPA laws by this time.
273 See INDUS. CoMI'N,
271 Interestingl;
275

Id.

Id. at 672.
277 See id.
276

278

Id.

279 See CAREY,

supra note 23, at 57-58.
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At the same time, the Industrial Commission's Final Report underscored the problems of a system in which the states exclusively had
the power to create corporations:
It is important to observe that whenever any State has put
conservative restrictions upon corporations, either as to their
formation or their management, other States have taken advantage of the situation and enacted such liberal laws that
corporations have removed to them from other States. Two or
three States have apparently for the sake of securing a certain
revenue easily collected, bid against each other by offering
more liberal inducements to corporations. 280
So went an earl), formulation of the "race to the bottom" feared as a
consequence of corporate "charter-mongering" among the states. 28 1
For this Article's purposes, though, it underscores the very different
starting points that the United States and Great Britain were operating from in matters of corporations and audits: the former had no
centralization of corporate laws, accountant certification, or securities
regulation, while the latter had all three. As explained below, these
crucial differences should have counseled against any easy adoption
by the United States of specific solutions, taken out of context, that
seemed to work in Great Britain. 282
Fundamentally then, the development of accounting and auditing--especially regarding provision of certified audits to clients for
"comfort" of interested third parties-was different in the
United
States. The banking community may have agreed as one banker "asserted that the accountants' clients were both the stockholders or
owners of a business, and the investing public and their agent, the
banker."283 Coupled with the needs of the fledgling Arnerican profession for expanded work engagements and enhanced prestige, this
unique trajectory soon led the profession to offer its audit
certification services to clients on behalf of broader and broader
classes of third part), beneficiaries. Additionally, unpopular corporate
empires were apparently only too eager to bring on other parties such
as accountants to deflect liability for financial misreporting.
280 INDUS. COMMri'N, supra note 244, at 642-43.
281 For a more contemporary account, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION
WVALL

STREET:

A

HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES

OF

AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN

CORPORATE FINANCE 42 (3d ed., Aspen Publishers 2003)
28. Sec infra notes 464-481 and accompanying text.
28 CAREY, supra note 23, at 78.

(1982).
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As earl), as 1910, the profession seemed to acknowledge this different trajectory, and in particular, appeared to disapprove of the limited nature of the British auditor's job:
"[The president of the ICAEW] believes that the auditor is
not "concerned in the volume of business a company does,
whether it is overtrading, whether its working capital is
sufficient, whether it is carrying on operations on too extensive a scale in countries where credit is bad and economic
conditions are unfavorable"-nor should an auditor act or
appear to act as a valuer. However, if assets appear to him to
have been overvalued, he should say so.
In the United States it is generally recognized that the duties of an auditor depend very much upon circumstances.
An auditor may certify merely to the correctness of the account-keeping, if that is all the directors of the company desire. Frequently, however, audits are made on behalf, not of
directors, but of banks or intending investors or dissatisfied
stockholders, and in such cases it will not be generally admitted in this country that an accountant has done his full duty
if he has discovered merely that the accounts and financial
statements are technically correct. The accountant's work
under such circumstances combines that of the investigator
284
and of the auditor."
The author of the foregoing quotation seems to misunderstand
the metes and bounds of the British statutory auditor's role. As previously explained, the latter simply is elected by the shareholders to verif3; on their behalf, that the reports presented by company management fairly reflect the company's state of affairs. 285 There is no provision for the British auditor to advance his opinions as to whether the
company is being correctly or well managed. So long as the reports
presented give shareholders an accurate view of the company, then
the shareholders can decide whether the company is being properly
run. If they believe that it is not, then the), can bring about a change
in management through total or partial ouster of the current board of
directors.
Further, although British directors could hire or provide for their
own internal audit of the company-and one would imagine that
Id. at 77 (quoting Editorial,J. ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1910).
2-5 See supra notes 223-229 and accompanying text.
284
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some did simply as part of good governance and internal controls of
the organization-they were not "masters" of the statutory audit and
auditors. Additionally, as to other sorts of non-statutory audits, such as
those commissioned by prospective creditors, it is not clear that the
British chartered accountant felt any more constrained as to the scope
of services than did an American counterpart. Even if the British
chartered accountant did feel more constrained, this just further underscored the different context of "auditors" in the British traditionthe auditor and audit are merely instruments for principals to make
sure that their agents are doing what they say the), are doing, not to
cast judgment on the overall wisdom of the enterprise. There is no
doubt, however, that, upon proper engagement orders described as
an "audit" or otherwise, British chartered accountants could accomplish an equally penetrating investigation as their Amnerican counterparts.
Of course, just as the respectable segment of the American accounting profession was trying to use these expanded new types of engagements to burnish the image of the profession, 286 some other members, of questionable motive and qualifications, used the mounting Icrative demand for such services to their own ends, offsetting whatever
salutary effects the former had. 28 7 A major window of opportunity for
the profession both to expand its services and reputation as a public
service minded, learned profession, however, was perceived in the passage of the new income tax law of 1913.288 Often excluded, for one reason or another, in much of the previous federal legislation or rulemaking relevant to the profession, the American Association of Public Accountants, was now ready to become an active player in shaping both
the passage and implementation of the new income tax law. 2 89 Through
a personal representative and a committee formed specifically for issues
of federal legislation, the American Association was able to have mean286 See id. at 54-55. An editorial in 1907 stated the following:
"Publicity is a safe and conservative remedy for most corporate abuses. The
certified public accountant is the authorized agent of publicity. Let popular
discussion of this subject proceed until the people shall demand that the affairs of every public-service corporation, of every bank and of every insurance
company shall be regularly examined by certified public accountants who are
independent of the directors, if not also of the stockholders."
Id. (quoting Editorial,J. ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1907).

2117
See id. at 83-84.
2
88 Tariff of 1913 (Underwood Tariff Act), Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 2, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
289 SeCCAREY, supra note 23, at 67-71.
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ingfid participation in the drafting and passage of the law, securing
modified provisions of importance to the profession.2 0
The real payoff of the income tax law, of course, was the increased business that it brought to CPAs by those trying to make sense
of, and get the best possible results under, the new tax system.291 The
profession was well primed for the latter as well, based on its experi292
ence with corporate clients under the Corporation Tax Act of 1909.
Arguabl); these sorts of engagements began aligning CPAs with their
corporate clients as advocates for the latter against the revenue seeking goals of the government. If so, then tax services represented an
early form of "non-audit service" that potentially compromised the
accountants' perceived objective and independent status as to third
parties, in this case the government.
Even in the absence of any requirements for formal, public
audits, one night question the alignment of accountants and their
clients in efforts to minimize each client's tax burden while accountants were promoting their value as "independent" auditors and investigators. In fact, one member of the profession later proposed that the
American Association of Public Accountants formally petition the
Treasury Department to require attestation of income tax returns by
accountants on behalf of filers. 293 The American Association chose

not to act on this proposal, apparently fearing that it would spur renewed government interest in registering accountants, such as had
been proposed by the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") a year
earlier in 1916.294 There was also some belief that "tunder Civil Service

Commission rules it would be impossible to appoint practicing accountants as employees of the government." 295 Over time, similar
proposals would surface, but they always were rejected overwhelmingly as contrary to most accountants' views of themselves as "'advocates"' of their tax clients who engaged in "'adversary proceedings"'
against the Internal Revenue Service on behalf of those clients. 2 96 To

the extent that tax clients were also audit clients, it is not clear how

290 See

id.
'91 See id. at 146.
292 Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909 (Corporation Tax Act), ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11,
112-17; See CAREY, supra note 23, at 64-67.
-93 See CAREYV, supra note 23, at 215-16.
"I See id. at 216.
295 Id.
296 Id.
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the accountant could be both an "advocate" on the tax side, while
"independent" on the audit side.
As accountants spread their serxices across larger svaths of the
economy and provided an increasing array of accounting, audit, and
tax services with demonstrable effects on broader classes of third parties, the question of legal liability was bound to arise. Further, as mentioned above, some accountants seemed to be not taking their role as
seriously as the leaders of the profession would like. 29 7 The following
two measures were suggested: first, import the English practice established by the Companies Acts and have shareholders elect auditors,
rather than letting boards appoint them; second, and somewhat counter intuitively, encourage litigation against accountants so as to establish
the legal duties of auditors through the courts. 298 In particular, the
leaders of the accounting professions were relatively less concerned
with determining the liability of auditors who failed to catch evidence
of embezzlement within a corporate client, than with establishing clear
legal duties when investors suffer losses based on their misplaced reliance on a defective auditor's certificate. Perhaps this lack of concern
was because the former seemed already a clearer case to make, assuming some defect, or willfil ignorance, in the audit process. The profession worried, correctly that it was less clear whether auditors had any
duty and hence liability to third parties, such as investors.
Pursuant to the foregoing debate, an editorial in the profession's
Journal of Accountancy practically begged the courts and legislatures to

step in and to provide guidance:
"It would therefore seem to follow, if an auditor has failed
to exercise reasonable care ... that he should be held in
some measure at least, responsible for losses sustained by investors .... One of the strongest inducements to this exercise of conservatism in certification ... vould be the possi-

bility of fixing upon the auditor legal liability for statements
made....
In order to protect the public against inefficiency ...

and

in order to protect the profession against the inclusion of
undesirable members we strongly advocate the theory that if
the laws today do not fix legal liability upon the auditor the),

297 See

supra note 287 and accompanying text.
.98See CAREY, supra note 23, at 80-81.
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should be so amended as to bring about that condition of
affairs. "299
The editorial board of the Journalof Accountancy would have done well
to remember the old adage, "be careful what you wish for." This plea
for legal regulation was ironically prescient.
Instead of requesting legal guidance, however, the profession
might have done better by simply considering the increasingly muddled allegiances of the American accountant/auditor to his client.
Not the least of these problems was the difficulty of performing objective audits that led to qualified certificates because the client company's management was not fully cooperating with the auditor's request for documentation. In the British system under the Companies
Act, 1929, the auditor would have to report whether management had
cooperated with the audit.30 0 The American auditor, however, was in a
bind: should the auditor give an unqualified certificate that was now
misleading and a dereliction of duty, or instead issue a qualified
certificate that would surely reflect unfavorably on company management, who would likely then fire that auditor? An editorial in the
JournalofAccountancy is quoted as musing that:
"Looking at the matter from the highest ethical viewpoint .... [i] t must be admitted that the proper course for
the accountant to pursue would be to refuse to conduct an
audit unless opportunity were given for verifying inventories
and accounts receivable and all other things having a bearing on the accounts.
But here the difficulty arises that many clients would be estranged thereby, and unfortunately some accountants are
not yet in a position to ignore the financial consideration .... The average accountant is not sufficiently inde30
pendent to be able to dictate in this respect." '

Although it is likely that the editorial board did not mean "independent" in the sense that term has taken on under the '33 Act and
'34 Act, it is again oddly appropriate that they chose the phrase "not
sufficiently independent" to present the glaring reality that many accountants would not be affluent enough to avoid being beholden to
9 Id. at 81-82(quoting Editorial,J. ACCOUNTANCY, May 1912).
300 See Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5,c. 23; supra notes 176, 208 and accompa-

nying text.
301 CAREY, supra note 23, at 82-83 (quoting Editorial,J. ACCOUNTANCY, n.d.).
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their paying clients. This should not have been a surprise. How many
accountants were affluent enough not to have to worry about retaining
clients and getting paid? Of course, the accountants themselves alread, had the answer-switch to the British system and have auditors
elected by the shareholders, which included allowing those shareholders to set auditor remuneration. Regardless, neither the profession as a whole, nor external lawmaking bodies, apparently were willing to effectuate this change. Alternatively, it may simply have been
one of those things that fell through the cracks between different systems of regulation for and among accountants, corporations, and the
financial services industry.
At any rate, much of this hand wringing by accountants, and Progressive Era reform rhetoric by government officials and commissions,
seems to have been drowned out by the economic boom of the Roaring
Twenties. Few people are interested in reform when everyone is making money--the overriding concern is instead to get in on the action
before it is too late. In tandem with the economy, then, the accounting
practice boomed from 1916 to 1930.302 Concurrendy although companies were not required by state or federal law to do so, many increasingly came to disclose audited financial statements in connection with
issuances of new securities. 30 3 The optimist might say these companies
did this because they believed it was the right thing to do; the cynic
might say that this was really just a marketing ploy to attract attention in
an increasingly crowded field of issuances. Wlatever the real motive,
the trend played into the desires of accountants to grow their practices,
and what could have been more alluring than the high profile "public"
engagement of certifying a hot new stock issuance?
Arguably the bigger, more respected accounting firms-many of
which ironically were originally started by transplanted English and
Scottish chartered accountants304--were worth a preniun through the
quality signaling function they could perform for corporate issuers, especially new or unknown ones. This phenomenon certainly exists today, when new or untested companies piggyback on the "legitimacy" of
brand name accounting firms, law firms, or investment banks to assure
prospective investors. Even established companies will use the reputation of these professional service providers to gain extra valuation in a
deal, or to coax uneasy parties into an unorthodox deal structure.

302 See id. at 144.
303 See id.
304

See id. at 22, 27-30, 33-35.
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This theory of "reputational intermediaries" who rent their reputation to others who currently lack such a reputation in the marketplace has been well documented in the literature. 30 5 It also has attracted some serious criticism, including perhaps the most important
rejoinder that it does not comport well with the way the history of the
marketplace has actually played out.3 0 6 It is also unlikely that an
efficient market for reputational intermediaries-necessary to induce
them to maintain their reputation through demonstrated integrity
and objectivity-can exist in today's highly concentrated market
dominated by the Big Four accounting firms. 30 7 Such an efficient
market, however, could exist in a world of "pure play" accounting/audit firms, with appropriate distribution of market share among
a number of competitive players. 30 8 In fact, the accounting/audit
marketplace of the early decades of the twentieth century was a more
compelling environment for the reputational intermediary system to
flourish. Indeed, it may have been that this environment was precisely
what created the signaling practices of accounting and other professional services firms in the real world that endured and led to the
suggestion of the theory decades later. If so, then the question to be
addressed below is whether the audit requirements of the '33 Act, and
rules promulgated under the '34 Act, shored up a budding, constructive practice, or whether instead they froze in time an experiment that
may have died out on its own through "natural" market forces.
In the meantime, accountants simply rode the boom, with only
minor trepidations as they saw instances of shoddy audits, and improper usage of respected firms' names, certificates, or misleading
snippets of reports by companies eager to gain the quality signaling
305The literature provides a more detailed discussion of reputational intermediaries. See

Reinier Kraakman, Coiporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE LJ. 857,
888-98 (1984); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liabilit Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 491 (2001). See generally Stephen Choi, MaretLessons
for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916 (1998); JOHN C. COFFEE, THE ACQUIESCENT GATEKEEPER: REPUTATIONAL INTERMEDIARIES, AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND THE GOVERNANCE

(Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Columbia Law Sch., Working Paper No. 191,
=
270944 (date
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid

OF ACCOUNTING

2001),

posted May 25, 2001); RonaldJ. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.j. 239 (1984); Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategv, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
306See B.W. Mayhew et al., The Effect ofAccounting Uncertainty and Auditor Reputation on
Auditor Objectivity, AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, Sept. 2001, at 49-70 (documenting that
reputational intermediaries act in reputation depleting ways to a degree not predicted by
the theory).
307 See Partno)y supra note 305, at 491.
308 See

O'Connor, supra note 14, at 68-69.
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function of a prestigious firm's "endorsement" of their issuances.

30 9

Considering the boom in stock issuance certification work, tax engagements with all the newly wealthy individuals and companies seeking to reduce their tax burdens, accounting system consulting work
generated from tax clients who wished to do better on their taxes next
year, and audits pursuant to commercial bankers' increased demands
for them from the accountants' clients, the profession found its services almost inexhaustibly in demand.3 1 0 Also, a rising demand curve
usually leads to higher valuations of the underlying goods or services,
which in turn often leads to greater perceived prestige of them. Not
bad for a bunch of "bookkeepers" who had a hard time getting organized and recognized only a few decades before.
III.

THE SECURITIES ACT OF

1933

Of course, all good things must end. With what now might seem
a depressingly predictable pattern, another great speculative boom
collapsed and took down many paper fortunes. In the first aftermath
of the 1929 crash, "populist scapegoats" were rounded up and prosecuted' s1 Poster boys for 1920s material success were quickly transformed into poster boys for everything that was greedy and evil. 312
Additionally, true to the pattern, even before the finger-pointing subsided, reformist legislation was in the offing in the form of the '33
Act. One commentator has suggested that regulation following in the
wake of a collapsed bubble is "the mirror image of the bubble-a kind
of speculative frenzy in regulation."313
Stoked by the harshness of the 1929 crash, the self-righteous indignation growing from the daily doses of outrageous .abuses disclosed from the Senate chamber, where the Pecora Investigation was
taking place, and the reformist allies of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who were hammering away at the evils that may have been prevented by proper regulation of business and the financial community,
the public essentially demanded congressional action. 314 Thus, when

309See CAREY, supra note 23, at 145. One respected firm w,-as forced to place a warning
note regarding improper use on its reports. See id.
310 See id. at 145-48.
311 Se Ribstein, supra note 39, at 91-92.
312 See id.
313 Id. at 78.
314 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 39. Dean Joel Seligman provides a more detailed
background on the immediate responses to the 1929 crash, such as the Pecora Investiga-
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President Roosevelt signed the '33 Act into law in May of 1933, it
seemed perhaps a hasty response to public outcry In fact, though,
President Roosevelt's own frequent invocation of Louis D. Brandeis's
famous study, Other People's Money, published in 1914,315 belies the
roots of the '33 Act, and subsequent '34 Act, in the earlier Progressive
Era that had been eclipsed by the Roaring Twenties. Thus, one historian of federal securities regulation pinpointed President Roosevelt's
comments as "paraphras[ing the famous quote from "Other People's
Money"]: 'Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; elec316
tric light the most efficient policeman."'

This could not have been better news for the accounting profession-the self-proclaimed "authorized agents of publicity."317 Further,
only a year earlier the NYSE adopted rules, in consultation with the
Institute of Accountants in the United States of Anerica (the "Institute"),3 18 to require that all listed companies have their financial
statements certified by accountants "qualified under the laws of some
3 19
state or country."
In fact, the Institute had earlier approached the NYSE in 1927 to
suggest requirements for better financial disclosure from listed companies, but while the boom continued apace, there seems to have
been little incentive for the NYSE to tinker with success. 320 Ironically,
only five years earlier it was the NYSE itself that was musing about better financial disclosure "in line with the English practice."3 21 The Journal of Accountancy is quoted as concurring with the position: "'What
can and should be done by legislation and effective public administra-

tion is to throw a light of publicity upon the issuance of securities that
tion. See id. at 18-38; see also CAREY, supra note 23, at 167-69 (discussing the Pecora Inves-

tigation).
315 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 41. See generally Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S i'IONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press 1933)

(1914).
316 Id. at 41-42 (quoting BRANDEIS, supra note 315, at 89). It is ironic that Louis D.
Brandeis is also the author of the seminal work that is commonly acknowledged as the
beginnings of the legal right to privac)y See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Rigit to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
317 See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
318
The Institute of Accountants in the United States of America is another forerunner
of the AICPA.
319 CAREY, supra note 23, at 169.
320 See id. at 163-64.

321Id. at 160. Notably, the Journal of Accountancy is quoted as calling for audits in conjunction with securities offerings still earlier, in 1919. See id. at 145 (citingJ. ACCOUNTANCY,
Jan. 1919).
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will enable investors to judge for themselves whether a given security
is sound and to what extent it is speculative.'- 3 22 Apparently the Journal of Accountancy also expressly advocated for adoption of provisions
from the British Companies Acts, including "independent audits."3 23
A noted accounting historian has suggested that if action along these
lines had been taken-"if the business and financial community had
disciplined itself in time"-then the '33 Act might not have been
needed. Of course, the community did not discipline itself adequately
because "[t]he stock market was zooming, corporations were merging, and holding companies in the utility field were developing vast
empires, financed by issue after issue of common stock. "324
Nevertheless, by the earl), 1930s, the accounting profession began
getting the kind of legal guidance it had been clamoring for since the
turn of the century. In 1931, the New York Court of Appeal decided
the landmark appeal of Ultramares Coip. v. Toutcie.325 Judge Benjamin
N. Cardozo, writing for the court, was willing to find that accountants
certifring financial statements had to make the certificate without
fraud. This duty ran to third-party creditors and investors as well, because the accountants knew that these parties might also rely on the
certification.3 26 Further, Judge Cardozo cautioned that "[flraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none."3 27
Judge Cardozo was unwilling, however, to extend liability to such "indeterminate" third parties for actions based on mere negligence, because then a "thoughtless slip or blunder," including the "failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries,"
could "expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount
for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."3 28 Thus, accountants who performed their audits in good faith, and who did not
attest to transactions for which the), had seen no documentary evidence, should not have any liability to third parties not included ex2

IM. at 161 (quotingJ. ACCOUNTANCY, n.d.).

Id. (citingJ. ACCOUNTANCY, n.d.). In truth, the Companies Acts do not call for "independent audits," but rather simply audits done by auditors elected by the shareholders,
who may employ professional accountants. A professional accountant could be elected
directly as an auditor, and he might have no other interest in the company other than this
engagement. But, there was no requirement for this, the only real hallmark of "independence" as we consider it today.
324 CAREY, supra note 23, at 161.
325 174 N.E. 441, 442 (N.Y 1931).
326 See id. at 444
327 Id.
323

328 Id.
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pressly as formal beneficiaries of the engagement contract-even if it
was foreseeable that the client might use the certificate in the future
with as yet unnamed parties.
One might question why the court was willing to find liability to
third parties for fraudulent misrepresentation, but not for negligence-was it just because fraud is more serious in some way? Perhaps, but the court also was concerned that the extension of liability
to third parties for negligence would render fraud and negligence
nearly coterminous. 32 9 The court also may have been considering that
fraud in this case sounded in tort, but negligence in performing the
audit was actually a breach of the contract between the accountant
and client. Thus, even though one generally might owe a duty of care
to the whole world that one can breach through negligent behavior,
here the specific shortcoming was not a negligent breach of that garden variety duty of care, but rather it was the negligent breach of a
specific implied duty arising only under the contractual relationship
of the parties. That is, accountants must provide audits "with the care
and caution proper to their calling." 330 As a result, to extend this contractual duty to others outside the chain of privity was both unwarranted and would result in a situation in which "[tihe hazards of a
business conducted on these terms [would be] so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty
331
that exposes to these consequences."
Ultramares provides an additional fascinating insight into the
changing environment for accountants acting as auditors. The plaintiff was asked to rebut the claim that allowing liability to third parties
for negligence would make negligence nearly indistinguishable from
fraud. The plaintiff responded by arguing, "first, that the duty to
speak with care does not arise unless the words are the culmination of
a service, and, second, that it does not arise unless the service is rendered in the purstit of an independent calling, characterized as public." 3 32 This suggests the development of the mistaken notion that
"public accountants" are called that because they owe some extra duty

329 See id. at 447.

174 N.E. at 444.
The court is not strictly limiting liability for negligence to parties in privity, but
rather it is limiting such liability to parties in privity or when a specified third party is so
clearly an intended third party beneficiary of the contract, so as to make him essentially a
party thereto.
332 Id. at 448.
330 Ultramares,
331 Id.
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to the public at large that private citizens do not.33 3 .As discussed
above, however, this simply was not the origin of the name, nor the
intent of the earl), accountants using it. 334 Judge Cardozo catches this
error and corrects it, as quoted earlier in this Article. 335
Clearly, Utrmnares is a mixed bag for accountants. On the one
hand, the case establishes that negligence in the audit engagement and
resultant certificate does not open accountants to liability to third parties---even for liabilities that were foreseeable. On the other hand, liability for fraud attaches on behalf of third parties just as much as it
does for the paying client. On one level, the result makes perfect sense
because service providers are primarily responsible to their contractual,
paying clients, but they are not allowed to mislead others intentionally
along the way, especially if reliance is foreseeable.3 36 On another level,
however, the result makes no sense at all, because the accountants then
must be acting, to varying degrees, on behalf of at least three distinct
groups, whose interests may not completely overlap-iianagement,
shareholders, and creditors. Thus, an unintentional message of Ultra'maresmay be that accountants simply should not act as auditors on behalf of multiple parties in the same matter, explicitly or implicitly. Of
note, all of the foregoing is simply in general accordance with the British audit system under the Companies Act, 1929.337
Although Ultramnares clarified the common law governing audit
services, a new federal legislative plan for regulating corporations and
their securities that would completely transform the legal landscape
for audits was being formulated as part of Franklin D. Roosevelt's
presidential campaign. The first and perhaps most crucial component
of this plan was set forth in President Roosevelt's nomination acceptance speech. Beyond the famous promise of a "New Deal" for Anerica, he proposed to undertake:
"[A] comprehensive planning for the reconstruction of the
great credit groups... I list an important place for that prize
statement of principle in the platform here adopted calling
for the letting in of the light of day on issues of securities,
See infra notes 464-489 and accompanying text (repeating theme).
See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
335 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
a3 Note that in Ultrainares it is management of the client company itself that does
333
334

much of the fraud and deceit that leads to the defective certificate. 174 N.E. at 442. Thus,
the real question that the court is grappling with is to what degree the accountants were

complicit in this fraud.
337Sec supra notes 106-238 and accompanying text.
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foreign and domestic, which are offered for sale to the investing public."338
In particular, President Roosevelt wanted to federalize corporation
laws so as to reinstate the sorts of shareholders' protections that had
eroded in the wake of excessive charter-mongering among the
states. 339 Taken together, the changes in state corporation laws allowed corporate managers to gain entrenched control of a company
in a manner that proved exceedingly difficult for increasingly disaggregated general shareholders to counter.340 To this end, the meteoric
growth of businesses in numbers and size, the ascendancy of a class of
professional managers, and the expansion of shareholder ranks for
large companies to transnational levels, worked together with changes
in the state corporation laws to create the serious agency problems of
the modern corporation set out so well by Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and
Gardiner C. Means in 1932.341
States had attempted to ameliorate these problems, at least with
regard to sales of corporate securities, by enacting "Blue Sky" laws as
early as 1911.342 Kansas began the trend-and gave the similar statutes
3 3
that were adopted in other states their name 4 -with a law that required companies who wished to sell stock in the state to file a description of operations with the bank commissioner. The commissioner could refuse to give the requisite sales permit when:
[H] e found any aspect of the company's business to be "unfair, unjust, inequitable, or oppressive to any class of contributors, or if he decides from his examination of its affairs
that said investment company is not solvent and does not intend to do a fair and honest business, and in his judgment
does not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds or other
securities by it offered for sale."44
As such, this law, and similar laws that followed, permitted so-called
"merits review" by the state authorities, which was markedly different

338 SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 19 (quoting Speech of Franklin D. Roosevelt, I THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 653 (1938).
39 See id. at 42-44.

340 See id.
341 See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 61.

342See SELIGMAN, sapra note 281, at 44-46.
343Such a law was "popularly known as a 'blue sky' law, since it was intended to check

stock s6ndlers so barefaced they 'would sell building lots in the blue sky.'" Id. at 44.
344 Id.
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from the British system under the Companies Acts, which instead
merely mandated truthfid disclosure of relevant information.
Despite initial success stories that prompted nearly identical statutes in seventeen states, and other securities regulation statutes in six
others, the statutes were, in fact, not particularly effective. 345 Nonetheless, after Kansas's law was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1917,
even more states signed on with their own laws so that by 1933, every
state save Nevada had one. 346 After the 1929 crash, however, it became
readily apparent that these trumpeted laws had not really worked: most
could be evaded through stock offerings by mail that crossed state lines
and many laws were amended so often as to render them impotent. 347
Ironically one noted historian of the securities laws has suggested
that the NYSE listing requirements established during the 1920s were,
relatively speaking, the most effective securities regulation of the era. 3 48
After quoting William Z. Ripley's statement that "' [b] eyond peradventure of doubt the New York Stock Exchange is today the leading
influence in the promotion of adequate disclosure [j]"' and Adolph A.
Berle, Jr.'s statement that "'the most forward-looking steps in finance
taken during the 1925-1929 boom were not taken by government, but
by that much maligned institution, the New York Stock Exchange[,j'"
Dean Joel Seligman nonetheless noted that the NYSE requirements
were not much more effective than Blue Sky laws.3 49 Other American
stock exchanges fared even worse, especially when they permitted ex3 50
tensive trading in unlisted securities.
Dean Seligman also pointed to the "primitiveness of accounting
standards" as a fatal flaw for fair and effective securities markets. 5 1 At
the same time, at the beginning of the boom, less than seventy percent
of NYSE listed firms were bound by agreements to provide shareholders with annual or quarterly statements, and only 242 out of 957 listed
firms provided both annual and quarterly statements to shareholders. 352 By 1933, however, all of the 1157 listed firms proxided annual
reports; sixty percent also provided quarterly reports; and eighty-five
345 See id. at 45.
346

See id.

supra note 281, at
See id. at 46-47.

347 SELIGMAN,
348

45-46.

349 Id. (quoting WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (Harper Bros.
1939) (1927) and statement of Adolph A. Berle, in RUDOLPH WtEISSMAN, THE NEW WALL
STREET (1939)).
350
351

352

See id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 48.
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percent underwent annual audits by CPAs with the results made publicly available.353 Dean Seligman also noted that "[t]he rapidity with
which periodic audited financial statements became commonplace
masked the continued unreliability of financial reporting" because "no
government or private agency effectively defined generally accepted
accounting principles." 35 4 Beyond this, however, as argued above, the
rapid rise in the use of audited statements may have been mainly a
marketing plo), ol, more generousl); a quality signaling best practice, to
attract investors in a quickly crowding field of issuances.
The only congressional precedent for federal regulation of securi55
ties was a limited six-month episode in 1918 during World War I.3
The Capital Issues Committee, authorized by Congress, may have been
simply a wartime expediency Yet, in final reports, it urged continuing
federal supervision of securities-especially as the patriotism-driven
success of the government's Liberty Bonds seemed to have whetted
the appetite of a whole new segment of the general population for
even more speculative investments. 3 56 Although President Woodrow
Wilson argued for permanent federal securities regulation, and numerous bills were introduced in Congress over the years, no other
357
formal regulation was initiated until passage of the '33 Act.
When Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President on his New
Deal platform, however, forces finally aligned to prioritize and to realize the goal of federal securities regulation earlier articulated by both
Louis Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson. 358 The Pecora Investigation had
whipped up such sentiment against Wall Street and the securities industry among members of Congress and the public, that the former
essentially were forced to act. 359 After some false starts, an initial draft
by Huston Thompson, a former member of the FTC, (the "Thompson
draft") was introduced in both houses in March of 1933, along with a
360
preliminary message from President Roosevelt:

353

See id.

354 Id.
355 See id. at 49. This, of course, is in addition to the earlier Progressive Era calls for
corporate and securities regulations discussed above, but none of those materialized into
concrete bills or actions. See supra notes 260-279 and accompanying text.
356 See SELIGIAN, supra note 281, at 48.
357 Id. at 49.
358 See id. at 50-51.
359 SeeJames M. Landis, The Legislative History ofthe Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASh.
L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
360 See id. at 30-31.
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To the Congress:
I recommend to the Congress legislation for Federal supervision of traffic in investment securities in interstate cornerce.
In spite of many State statutes the public in the past has
sustained severe losses through practices neither ethical nor
honest on the part of many persons and corporations selling
securities.
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should
not take any action which might be construed as approving
or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound in the
sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that
every issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending
the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.
This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor
the further doctrine, "Let the seller also beware." It puts the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give
impetus back to honest dealing in securities and thereby
bring back public confidence.
The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the
public vith the least possible interference to honest business.
This is but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors. It should be followed by legislation
relating to the better supervision of the purchase and sale of
all property dealt in on exchanges, and by legislation to correct unethical and unsafe practices on the part of officers
and directors of banks and other corporations.
What we seek is a return to a clearer understanding of the
ancient truth that those who manage banks, corporations,
and other agencies handling or using other people's money
are trustees acting for others.
-Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House, March 29, 1933.361
361 73 CONG. REC. 937 (1933), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY 1933-1982, at 20 (comp. by Sec. Law Comm., Fed. Bar Ass'n, 1983).
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President Roosevelt seemed concerned that the legislation
should neither authorize merits review of securities by the federal
government nor appear to attach liability to the federal government
for securities that appeared to have its imprimatur (like Treasury
bonds). Apparentl); however, Huston Thompson "didn't get the
memo" on this because his draft explicitly permitted the FTC to revoke the registration of any offeror whose "affairs are in unsound
condition or insolvent" or when "the enterprise or business of the issuer, or person, or the security is not based upon sound principles,
362
Beyond
and ...revocation is in the interest of the public welfare."
these undesirable merits rexiew provisions, however, the Thompson
draft was deemed unsatisfactory in many other ways as well by the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (the "Commerce
Committee") of the House of Representatives to whom it had been
referred. 363 It did not fare as poorly in the Senate, where it was initially referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.3 64 Despite the drubbing the Thompson draft took both from the House committee
members and later historians, it is actually not that crazy, nor does it
represent a radical departure from the major outlines of either the
British Companies Act, 1929, or the final version of the '33 Act. In
fact, the introduction, inter alia, of a waiting period after filing and
before the stock can be sold arguably made the '33 Act more of a departure from the Companies Act, 1929, than the Thompson draft was.
For this Article's purposes, the most important provisions of the
Thompson draft exist in this same section 6 which contained the controversial powers of the FTC to revoke registrations. Most of the triggers for this pover were probably uncontroversial: violation of the act
or orders of the FTC; fraudulent activities of the issuer; dishonesty or
or
fraudulent representations by the issuer, especially in prospectuses
365 It
business.
issuer's
the
of
activities
simnilar documents; and illegal
was only the two last specific triggers of the section, cited in the discussion above, that were based on the controversial merits review the362 See H.R. 4314,

§ 6 (1933), reprinted in 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES AcTS,

supra note 1, at 13; see also Landis, supra note 359, at 30-31.
363 See

SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 51-57; Landis, supra note 359, at 31-33. For politi-

originally subjected merely to "perfecting amendments" by the
cal reasons, the draft %%-as
new drafting team led by Felix Frankfurter, but ultimately even those portions of Huston

Thompson's draft that were originally retained were "happily discarded." Landis, supra
note 359, at 34.
36 SeeSELIGMNAN, su pra note 281, at 67-68; Landis, supra note 359, at 41-42.

3r See H.R. 4314, § 6, reprinted in 3
note 1, at 12-15.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES

AcTS, supra
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ory. Beyond these specific triggers, however, section 6 also sets out the
rights of the FrC as to how it would conduct an examination to determine whether any, of the triggers have occurred:
In making such examination the [FTC] or other officer or
officers designated by it shall have access to and may compel
the production of all the books and papers of such issuer,
representatives, or underwriters, and may administer oaths
to and examine the officers of such issuers, representatives,
underwriters, or other entities or other person connected
therewith as to its business and affairs and may, in its discretion, require the production of a balance sheet exhibiting
the assets and liabilities of an), issuer, representative, or underwriter, or his income statement, or both, to be certified
by a public accountant approved by the [FTC] .366
This was, of course, no general requirement for an audit, but
rather only a targeted provision of audited financial statements in furtherance of a government investigation. From the auditor's perspective,
he would be retained for a specific limited engagement with a specific
third party beneficiary-and thus, under the reasoning of Utrianares,
he would have full liability under both fraud and negligence theories to
that beneficiary. There likely would be little incentive for collusion with
management in this matter, however, even though the audited company would technically be the paying party in this transaction.
The Institute, in the meantime, had been made aware that such a
bill was in the offing, but chose not to appear formally during any hearings for fear of hostile questioning and further bad public relations. 367
When Thompson's draft came out, however, the Institute's members
quickly noticed the FTC examination audit provision and sent a letter
to the Commerce Committee suggesting that this audit pro'ision
should be extended to all registration statements. 368 The letter was possibly followed up with personal lobbying by the Institute's Washington
legal counsel, J. Harry Coxrington.3 69 One accounting historian has asserted that the foregoing "apparently made all impression on the

Id. at 5.
Scc CAREY, supra note 23, at 183. The profession itself often had been lumped in
with all of the other purported bad actors when the entire financial services industry came
under fire in the uake of the 1929 crash.
w Sce id. at 184.
369 Sce id.
36

367
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House Committee on Interstate Commerce, since its bill was amended
370
to include the audit provisions which finally became the law."
At the same time, and quite uncoordinated with the Institute and
J. Harry Covington, the then president of the New York State Society
of Certified Public Accountants, Colonel Arthur H. Carter, took it
upon himself to contact the Senate's Committee on Banking and
Currency (the "Banking Committee"), to which the Thompson bill
had been redirected from the Committee on the Judiciary.371 Colonel
Carter "was a West Point graduate, a man of action and of military
mien," as well as a senior partner at Haskins and Sells. 372 Not part of
the current governing council of the Institute, he instead sent his
telegram on behalf of the New York Society. In it, he too suggested an
audit by "'accountants qualified under the laws of some state'" of
financial statements to be used in prospectses. 373 The communication won him a place at the Banking Committee's upcoming hearings
on the Thompson draft. The full transcript provides many fascinating
exchanges, relevant not only to the profession's desire to win the
audit provision, but also for many issues of auditor independence to
come. Accordingly, much of the record is transcribed below, with appropriate commentary:
Mr. CARTER. At the outset I wish to state that my sympathies are with the general principles of the proposed bill
known as the Federal Securities Act. I also wish to have it
understood that I would advocate that, if possible, the proposed bill be changed so as to afford even greater protection
to the investor than it now contemplates....
...
I would suggest that the following be added after the
words "actual business":
The accounts pertaining to such balance sheet, statement of income and surplus shall have been examined by
an independent public accountant and his report shall
present his certificate wherein he shall express his opinion
as to the correctness of the assets, liabilities, reserves, capital and surplus as of the balance sheet date and also the
income statement for the period indicated.

370 Id.

371 See id. at 184-85; Landis, supra note 359, at 31.
372

CAREY, supra note 23, at 184-85.

373 Id. (quoting Letter from Col. Arthur H. Carter (Mar. 30, 1933)).
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Senator BARKLEY. How much more and additional employment would that give to certified accountants?
Mr. CARTER. Eighty-five percent of the companies that are
listed on the exchanges in New York today are examined.
Senator REYNOLDS. Do you think it proper to insert there
that these independent public accountants should be privi-

leged to state their opinion as to the value of securities or
the condition of the company?
Mr. CARTER. We are unable to express an opinion as to the
value of securities ....

374

Colonel Carter appears to have misunderstood Senator Reynolds's line
of questioning; Senator Reynolds clearly seems to be asking why accountants should get such a valuable government-mandated franchise.
Senator REYNOLDS. Do you think they should be permitted
to express their opinions about [the accounting records]?
Mr. CARTER. Yes.
Senator REYNOLDS. Vill not the figures themselves show?
Mr.

CARTER.

The figures will not necessarily show...

Senator BARKLEY. Do you think that the Federal Trade
Commission's records or these reports ought to be encumbered by the bookkeeping processes by which accountants
would arrive at an opinion as to the value of a stock?
Mr. CARTER.

I do not see how the Federal Trade Commis-

sion can properly discharge its duty by merely accepting a
statement that has not been independently examined and
certified to by an accountant.
Senator BARKLEY. In other words, after the statement has
been filed by the officers of the company you want an independent organization to go over it and then report to the
Federal Trade Commission whether this is correct or not?
Mr. CARTER. I mean that that statement itself should have
been the subject of an examination and audit by an independent accountant.
Senator GORE. Before filing?
Mr.

CARTER.

Before filing.

s Hearings, supra note 1, at 56-62 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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Senator GORE. Is that patterned after the English system?
3 75
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir.
This was not exactly true. The Companies Act, 1929, merely provides
that the company's auditor must certify the company's profit and loss
statements-not balance sheets-for the last three years, as applicable, for inclusion in an), prospectus to be used for offering to sell
376
stock to the public.
Senator A/VAGNER. Well, basically, are not these facts that
have got to be alleged rather than an opinion?
Mr. CARTER. Under the terms of the bill it has to be given
under oath. I do not see that anyone can certify under oath
that a balance sheet giving many millions of dollars of assets
is as a matter of fact correct. He can state his opinion based
upon a thorough investigation.
Senator BARKLEY. In other words, before the officers of
the company that is issuing stock shall file that statement
that is contained in this bill with the Federal Trade Commission the company must call in outside independent accountants and give them the job of going over it and passing on
whether the) have told the truth or not. Well, I am not for
your amendment, I will say that now.
Mr. CARTER. Later on in the act it provides that the Commission may call for such a statement. The only point I am
trying to make is this, that I think the such an examination
should be a part of the application rather than after the application has been filed.
Senator ADAMS. The law does not require any examination, as I read it.
Mr. CARTER. No.
Senator ADAMs. That is, it merely requires the filing of this
statement.
Mr. CARTER. That is right.
Senator ADAIs. Then by the fact of filing this statement
the), in substance get the right to go into interstate commerce and sell securities. There is no such requirement for
3 77
examination to be included in the application.
Id. at 56-57 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
376 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
377 Heaings, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
375
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Colonel Carter seems to be unaware of the larger context behind this
line of questioning. As discussed above, one of the major sore points
for the Thompson draft was its inclusion of merits review powers for
the FTC. 378 At the same time, the Banking Committee members seem
to be concerned that "opinions" will not be of much help to investors,
either when deciding to invest in a compan), or in bringing a lawsuit
for fraud or negligence later.
Mr. CARTER. Not in the application. But there is in the bill
a provision which gives the Commission a right to demand
such an investigation and demand such a report as a result
of such investigation. My point is to put that in the application in the beginning.
Senator BARKLEY. Do yon think it is more in the interest of
the public that is to buy these securities, if there is to be an)
check up or any guarantee as to the correctness, that it be
done by some Government agency rather than by some private association of accountants?
Mr. CARTER. I think it is an impractical thing for the Government agency to do it effectively.
Senator REYNOLDS. Why?
Mr. CARTER. Because it involves such a large force. It involves the question of time.
Senator REYNOLDS. Well, it would not require an) more
time on the part of government officials to make a check up
and audit than it would by private individuals, would it?
Mr. CARTER. I think the public accountant is better
equipped to do that than the average government agency
would be able to do that.
Senator GORE. How many public accountants do you think
would be available for this service?
Mr. CARTER. There are approximately 15,000 certified
public accountants in the United States today qualified under the laws of the various States.
Senator BARKLEY. How many in your organization?
Mr. CARTER. Two thousand.
Senator BARKLEY. IS there an), relationship between your
organization with 2,000 members and the organization of
controllers represented here yesterday with 2,000 members?

378

See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
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None at all. We audit the controllers.

BARKLEY.

You audit the controllers?

Mr. CARTER. Yes; the public accountant audits the controller's account.

Senator

Who audits you?
Our conscience.

BARKLEY.

Mr. CARTER.
Senator BARKLEY. I am wondering whether after all a controller is not for all practical purposes the same as an auditor, and must he not know. something about auditing?
Mr. CARTER. He is in the employ of the company. He is
subject to the orders of his superiors.

Senator

BARKLEY.

I understand. But he has got to know

something about auditing?
Mr. CARTER.

Senator

Yes.

BARKLEY.

He has got to know something about

bookkeeping?
Mr. CARTER. But he is not independent.

Senator

REYNOLDS.

Let me ask you this question, Colonel.

These companies are going to arrive at these figures through
their special auditors. All right. Now you want the members
of your organization to check up on their figures?
Mr. CARTER. As we do in many cases of industrial companies every year.
Senator REYNOLDS. All right. Then it goes to the Commission, does it not?
Mr. CARTER.

Senator

Yes.

REYNOLDS.

Have they got to check their accounts

and your account?
Mr. CARTER. I do not think so. I do not think they would
have to go to that.

Senator

REYNOLDS.

Why should your members ask that

they be permitted and empowered to check these accounts?
Mr. CARTER. Because it is generally regarded that an independent audit of any business is a good thing.

Senator

REYNOLDS.

All right. Then after it goes to the

Commission they have to check up to see who is right; they
have to go through and audit again. There has to be a Government audit, as suggested by Senator Barkley. Would it not
be creating more difficulty and more expense and more
time for the Government if auditing organizations interest
themselves in these various and sundry corporations?
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Mr. CARTER. I do not think so. I think if a corporation
wished to issue some securities and had been employing independent public accountants for 20 years those accountants should be able to make this examination more economically and quickly than the Government.

Senator

REYNOLDS.

Could the), do it more economically

than the Government?
Mr. CARTER. I think so.
Senator GORE. There would not be an) doubt about that.

Senator

REYNOLDS.

Why?

We know the conditions of the accounts; ve
know the ramifications of the business; we know the pitfalls
of the accounting structure that the company maintains. You
3 79
have got every kind of business to deal with.
Mr. CARTER.

This same argument resurfaces numerous times all the way to the present, when it has been used to justify the provision of non-audit services to audit clients-the familiarity that auditors have with their clients' enterprises puts them in the best position to provide the myriad
non-audit services; at the same time, the provision of non-audit services is claimed to help the efficiency of the annual audit too. Of
course, this argument proves too much, as there then seems to be few
limits to what services auditors should be allowed to provide to their
38 0
clients.
Senator REYNOLDS. Suppose that we decide in the final
passage of this bill here to employ five or six hundred auditors from your organization, that would be all right, then,
would it not?
Mr. CARTER. I do not think the Government could employ
five or six hundred independent accountants.
Senator REYNOLDS. Why could they not?
Mr. CARTER. I do not think the type of men that are in the
public practice of accountancy would leave their present
practice to go in the Government employ.
Senator REYNOLDS. Well, if it were sufficiently remunerative the), would?
Mr. CARTER. Yes; if the Government made their time
worth while.
379

Hearings,supra note 1, at 57-59 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).

-18See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 64.
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Senator REYNOLDS. The bill here provides for taking care
of the expenses incident thereto by way of registration.
Mr. CARTER. Well, you will have to build some more buildings in Washington to house them if you are going to do that.

Senator
all.

38 1

REYNOLDS.

Then we had better not pass this bill at

This last exchange evidences contemplation of simply having the federal government perform the general audits, if any are to be done.
Such proposals seem to have surfaced at least occasionally as the
statutory audit system developed under both the '33 Act and the '34
38 2
Act, but the), are always deemed politically impossible.
Senator ADAMS. How much of a burden is this going to
put on a relatively small company? You were speaking a while
back of the companies whose stocks are listed being independently audited. Now coming under the control of this
bill are going to be thousands of small companies putting
out an issue for their original financing. How much of a
burden and cost is that going to put on them?
Mr. CARTER. Very little measured in value to the investor
383
and to them.
This was a nice rhetorical flourish, but the senators do not appear to
be amused.
Senator GORE. What would be the range?
Mr. CARTER. My experience would be that the average
company pays around $500 or $600 or $700 for its auditing,
that is, taking the large and the small together.
Senator GORE. How often do they resort to that?
Mr. CARTER. Every year. And the largest organizations of
our country do it and have been doing it for the last 15 years.
Senator GORE. But they have not been available for any
public authority to examine and afford no safeguards?
Mr. CARTER. They have been published in their annual
reports and distributed to all of their stockholders, to the
newspapers and anyone who calls for them.
381Hcanings, supra note 1, at 59 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
382
3m

SecO'Connor. supra note 14, at 47, 72-73.
Hcanings, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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Senator GORE. And have not done an), good?
Mr. CARTER. Yes, sir; I think they have.
Senator GORE. We have had all this debacle here in spite
of that.
Mr. CARTER. You still have some very sound companies
and industries in this country.3s4
You have to admire Colonel Carter's tenacity on this one.
The CHAIRMAN. Most of these people applying to be registered already have an independent audit. It is not necessary
to put them in the law. That is their practice now; that is,
they are supposed to have already.
Mr. CARTER. I think the trend has been decidedly in that
direction in the past five years, and especially in the last
three years, and I certainly think it is a safeguard that should
not be discouraged.38 5
The Chairman, Senator Duncan Fletcher, makes an excellent point.
Colonel Carter rebuts it only by saying the trend "should not be discouraged," but there is a wide gulf between "not discouraging" and
congressionally mandating something. Publicly disclosed audits already were being employed by eighty-five percent of companies listed
on the NYSE, yet, as Senator Gore points out, this did not seem to do
much in terms of preventing, or even minimizing, the colossal failures
of the 1929 crash. At the same time, the Thompson draft, even
amended as Colonel Carter was requesting, would not have required
those companies already employing public audits to have done anything differently. Given the widespread failures and stock price decline of even surviving companies, this problem cannot be resolved
then by assuming that the audited companies all survived, and are in
better shape, than the non-audited companies.
This observation-together with the apparent fact that all of the
tweaking of auditor independence rules formulated by the SEC up
until Enron and other scandals did not prevent the myriad of audit
failures linked to compromised independence-provides grist for
anyone who wants to argue that mandatory disclosure and/or statutory audits under the securities laws are unnecessary. Perhaps the system simply helps keep people honest. Given the expense of compliance, however, some might argue that from a cost-benefit perspective,
384 Id. at 59-60 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
85Id. at 60 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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mandatory disclosure and/or statutory audits are a failure and should
be substantially modified or completely elininated. 386 Additionally,
for all the hype surrounding it, at least one commentator has argued
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,387 did not really change the dis38
closure system radically. 8
Further, the combination of mandatory disclosure and statutory
audits should not necessarily be seen as a package deal. The '34 Act
simply authorized the SEC to determine whether the statutory mandatory disclosures of issuers should also be certified by independent
auditors. A more robust reputational intermediary market may have

developed where audits were simply permissive and could serve as a
quality signaling best practice, rather than as the commodified loss
389
leader they appear to have become.
Senator GORE. Is this mandatory in England, the requirement that an independent accountant shall check up?
Mr. CARTER. All companies in England are required to be
audited by an independent accountant, who is present at the
stockholders' meeting and is available to answer any questions the stockholders wish to put to him.
Senator GORE. -Adthey list the accountants that will be
acceptable?
390
Mr. CARTER. That is right.

38 In the 1980s, there was a serious debate over the value of mandatory disclosure, but
the general consensus appears to have been that, on balance, it enhanced the functioning
of capital markets. For a synopsis of this debate, see MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 297-306 (4th ed. 2004). Recently, a modified form of this debate has arisen with
arguments for "issuer choice," in which companies need only comply with some disclosure
system somewhere in the world, not necessarily the U.S. system, even if the company's
stock is sold and/or traded in U.S. capital markets. See generally Stephen J. Choi & Andrew
T. Guzman, The Dangerous ExtraterritorialityofAmerican Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 207 (1996); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
InternationalReach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Merritt B. Fox,
Retaining,landatorv Securities Disclosure: IWy Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA.
L. REv. 1335 (1999); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1 (1999); Roberta Romano, Empowering Itvestors: A Market Approach to
Secu ritics Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 2359 (1998).
387 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2004)).
38" See generally LaTence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (and It Just Might 11bir), 35 CONN. L. RE'. 915 (2003).
8 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 72 n.498.
390 Hearings,supra note 1, at 61-62 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
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This, of course, is simply wrong. The Companies Act, 1929, did not
require that accountants provide audits, much less "independent" accountants-a notion that did not even seem to exist at the time in either the Companies Acts generally or the ICAEW and ICAS as the
regulators of chartered accountants. 391 Colonel Carter's comments
further obscure the facts that the shareholders themselves elect the
auditor in the first place and that the auditor's report must be read
aloud at the annual meeting. Senator Gore, however, did seem to understand that the shareholders at least have some type of right to select auditors. Finall; this exchange conflates the Companies Act,
1929's annual audit process with the separate, and different, requirement for certified profit and loss statements in prospectuses.
The remainder of Colonel Carter's testimony that concerned the
request for a general audit requirement covers the Banking Committee's continuing interrogation as to whether such a requirement will
add to the merits review slant of the Thompson draft or even provide
a government-mandated tool that could be used to a filing company's
distinct disadvantage at the hands of competitors. 392 Overall, Colonel
Carter's session clearly did not go swimmingly well, and in fact, his
efforts may have backfired. The Senate not only neglected to add his
hoped for general audit provision, although perhaps not due to his
statements, but also removed the existing FTC audit provision!

393

Further, other than the original FTC audit provision, the Thompson draft and its immediate revisions were silent as to accountants,
auditors, and audits. A later Senate report analyzing the bill expressly
mentions that parts of it, especially the information to be disclosed on
a registration statement, "follow[] to some extent that required in the
British act."394 Huston Thompson himself credits the Companies Act,

1929, among other laws, as a model in his testimony in the Banking
Committee hearings.

395

At this point, however, other than in the

House version of the bill, there were no audit provisions in the proposed securities law. The bill, however, was very much alive in all
other respects in the Banking Committee.
As discussed above, however, for all intents and purposes the
Thompson draft was dead in the House, even as it still contained at
391See supra notes 200-214 and accompanying text.
392SeeHearings,supra note 1, at 62 (statement of Col. Arthur H. Carter).
393 See S. REP. No. 73-47 (1933) (text of reported bill), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 361, at 13-14, 43-44.
394See id. at 3 (text of accompanying report).
995 See Heaings, supra note 1, at 56-62 (statement of Hon. Huston Thompson).

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 45:741

least the FTC examination audit provision. President Roosevelt
quickly turned to his close and trusted friend Felix Frankfurter 39to6
take over production of a new draft to be introduced in the House.
Felix Frankfurter, in turn, enlisted the help of James Landis, Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas Corcoran as a drafting team under his oversight (the "Landis-Cohen team").397 After obtaining the consent of
Sam Rayburn, the Chair of the Commerce Committee, the LandisCohen team wvent to work and drafted the core of the '33 Act in only a
few days.

398

This core also was based expressly on the British Companies Act,
1929.399 As such, and more in line with President Roosevelt's intentions, it was centered solely on the goal of "full and fair disclosure"
rather than the more controversial merits based review contained in
the Thompson draft. 40 0 But whereas the Thompson draft was consistent with the Companies Act, 1929's allowance of sales of securities
simply upon adequate registration with the Registry Office (U.S. offerors would file with the FTC), the Landis-Cohen team added the
requirement for the so-called "waiting period." This allowed the FTC
to examine the registration statement and conduct examinations of
the issuer's records, if necessary, before the issuer could proceed to
actually sell the registered stock. 40 1 This was quite a departure from
both the Companies Acts, 1929, and the Thompson draft, and created
many secondary effects upon the financial markets, including the402use
of so-called "red herring" prospectuses during the waiting period.
The Landis-Cohen team also amended the provisions to require
specific information in the registration statement so that they were
"both tightened and expanded." 40 3 Additionall)y the Landis-Cohen
396

See SELIGIMAN,

supra note 281, at 57-58; Landis, supra note 359, at 33.

397 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 61; Landis, supra note 359, at 33-34. Dean Selig-

man suggests that Thomas Corcoran w ,as not brought in so much to draft the legislation,
but rather to help lobby it through Congress. See SELiGMAN, supra note 281, at 63. James
Landis gives no such indication, although he does mention that the group often met with
Thomas Corcoran only at night because "his duties prevented him from giving his full time
to this project." Landis, supra note 359, at 37. Nonetheless, this Article adopts the convention of Dean Seligman to call the group the "Landis-Cohen team." See SELIGMAN, supra
note 281, at 61.
398 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 63; Landis, supra note 359, at 34.
399 Landis, supra note 359, at 34.
400 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 63; Landis, supra note 359, at 34-35. This Article
does not purport to give a detailed history of all the provisions of what would become the
'33 Act, but rather mainly focuses on the development of its audit provisions.
401 Sec Landis, supra note 359, at 34-35.
402 See id. at 34-35 n.il.
403 See id. at 35.
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team "was particularly anxious through the imposition of adequate
civil liabilities to assure the performance by corporate directors and
officers of their fiduciary obligations and to impress upon accountants the necessity for independence and a thorough professional approach." 404 In his later recollection of the legislative history of the '33
Act, James Landis noted that:
Despite the fact now generally recognized that the registration requirements of the Securities Act have introduced into
the accounting profession ethical and professional standards
comparable to those of other recognized professions, the
then dean of the accounting profession, George 0. May, of
Price, Waterhouse & Co. was strangely opposed to our proposed requirements for independent accountants. 4 05
"Strangely opposed" indeed! George May vould have been incensed
on two fronts: first, because the Landis-Cohen bill allowed the FTC to
set accounting standards and rules-a long-standing goal of the profession itself generally; and George May in particular; 406 second, because accountants now were enumerated specifically as those with

joint liability for nearly any defect in a registration statement that led
407
to an investor's lawsuit.
It is unclear whether the actual general audit provisions entered
the draft at this point as well. Regardless, the Landis-Cohen team draft
was presented to Sam Rayburn and the Commerce Committee on
April 10, 1933, as "perfecting amendments" to the Thompson draft,
so as to not offend Huston Thompson. 408 After approval, the team set
to work with Middleton Beaman, the House's chief draftsman, "to
40 9
hone the bill."

Dean Seligman asserted that at this point Benjamin Cohen suggested that the bill include a detailed schedule of data be included in
the registration statement. If so, then the general audit provisions
would likely have been introduced at this time as well. 410 In Dean
Seligman's account, James Landis vehemently countered this sugges-

tion by arguing that it was better to give the FTC general power to is404Id.
405 Id. at 35 n.12.
406 SeeCAREY, supra note 23, at 182, 191-92.
407 See id. at 192.
408See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64; Landis, supra note 359, at 36.
409See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64; Landis, supra note 359, at 37-38.
410 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64.
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sue regulations in this regard. 411 Benjamin Cohen pushed back by ar4 12
guing that James Landis's plan would risk ineffectual regulation.
Middleton Beaman allegedly gave the first resolution by "overruling
Cohen" on the grounds that it was best "to eliminate from the draft
any material not essential to the bill's structure." 4 13 At this point, Benjamin Cohen is alleged to have brought Felix Frankfurter into the
414
fray, and threatened to quit.
Unfortunately, Dean Seligman cites no clear support for the reported exchange to this point. 41 5 He does, however, next cite a telegram from Felix Frankfurter to President Roosevelt which appears to
support the contention that there was some important debate over
including such a schedule. The Frankfurter telegram of April 14,
1933, is cited as arguing that:
"[T] he onission of specific data to be disclosed would 'raise
needless questions of constitutionality as to delegation of
legislative power,' invite frustration of the bill's purposes by
hostile judicial interpretation, and 'jeopardize effective enforcement because of the enormous discretion it leaves to
the [FTC] ... thereby inviting laxity, favoritism, and indif416
ference.'"
Dean Seligman cited a subsequent telegram from Felix Frankfurter of
April 17, 1933, which thanked President Roosevelt for intervening
with Sam Rayburn on the bill. 417 Felix Frankfurter also telegraphed
Benjamin Cohen around the same time, coaxing him to stay on the
project, and contacted Raymond Moley, a member of President Roosevelt's administration and a supporter of the project, to help mend
fences between James Landis and Benjamin Cohen.418
In contrast, James Landis, in his own account, professed not only
not to recall this heated dispute, but also not to recall exactly how the
crucial schedule came to be. 419 He stated, "[The new draft] also contains the device of schedules setting forth in detail the items of information to be presented in the registration statement. I have no dis41 See id.
412 See id.
413Id.
414See id.
415See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 64.
416 Id. at 64-65.
417 See id. at 65.
418 See id.

a19 Landis, supra note 359, at 38.
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tinct memory of the origins of that device." 42° His next comments,
however, suggest what might have happened:
I believe that [the device] was probably due to Beaman's desire to eliminate from the draft material not essential to its
main structure. I do recall his comment that, handled as a
schedule, it would probably be glossed over by the committee after that committee had exhausted its patience on the
bill itself. In this he proved to be right. I believe, however,
that he knew as well as we that the core of the registration
421
requirements lay in those schedules.
This hardly sounds as if James Landis had opposed the inclusion of a
specific schedule of requirements generally-in fact, he clearly seems
to support it as a crucial part of the bill. Of course, James Landis's
memory could have been failing him on this matter. The more plausible story is that the debate was perhaps only partly over whether to include the requirements at all, and partly over whether to include such
requirements, if included at all, within the body of the bill, or instead
to attach them as a schedule after the body of the bill as a separate
item.
The Landis-Cohen team members had already deferred once to
political expediency when the), called their first draft "perfecting
amendments" to the Thompson draft. Perhaps now too, whether at
Middleton Beaman's direct or indirect suggestion, or their own intuition, they decided that the list of disclosure items for registration statements would be too distracting or controversial if placed in the main
text. Alternatively; perhaps, there really was a struggle between James
Landis and Benjamin Cohen as to the policy implications of placing
firm requirements in this bill, instead of including only enabling language that delegated the specifics to the FTC. Either way, pushing the
requirements into a separate schedule might have been seen as a nice
compromise: the Commerce Committee and/or James Landis could
be appeased partly that the requirements were not technically part of
the bill text. Benjamin Cohen, and maybe James Landis, could feel
comfortable that the requirements had nonetheless been laid out as
part of a congressional action, and not "merely" by delegated action
by the FTC.

420

Id.

421 Id.
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At the same time, use of the separate schedule "device" was hardly
unprecedented. In fact, arguably the schedule and much of its contents
had simply been lifted, with or without credit, directly from the Companies Acts, where a forerunner had been introduced as early as the
Joint Stock Companies Act, 1856.422 Originall)y the removal of this earlier version from the body of the prior Joint Stock Companies Act of
1844, as amended, into a separate table/schedule seemed to have been
part of the shift to establish these requirements as default provisions
that could be expressly modified by the company either at its inception
or by special resolution later.423 The Companies Act, 1879, however,

brought many of these provisions, in particular the audit provisions,
back into the body of the text, presumably to emphasize that they were
424
binding again and not merely default rules.

Further, the Companies Act, 1928, as consolidated by the Companies Act, 1929-which served as the acknowledged model for the
Landis-Cohen bill-included a Schedule IV that set out all the requirements for information to be contained in any prospectus used by
a company to sell stock, including the new audit provision. 425 The requirements of this Schedule V, however, were no less mandatory than
other provisions included in the text of the statute. The eventual
Schedule A of the '33 Act bears some resemblance to Schedule IV,
and so, in some ways, it is not clear what all the preceding fuss was
about-no new conceptual ground was being broken by the "device"
of a schedule, nor for that matter, a specific set of requirements for
prospectuses (including some select audited financial statements).
Instead, at most, this may have been an argument over diveiging from
the Companies Act, 1929 model/precedent either as to removing the
requirements altogether, or pushing them back into the body of the
bill, perhaps to give them even more force.
Regardless of how the schedule came to be included, the subsequent development of the Landis-Cohen draft is fairly well documented. The House Commerce Committee had created a subcommittee tinder Sam Rayburn to bring the draft along in confidence until it
was suitable for "prime time." 426 An April 21, 1933, draft included the
delegation of power to the FTC to define accounting terms.
422 See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
123

See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.

424 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
425 See supra note 197.
426 See SELIGMAN,

supra note 281, at 65; Landis, supra note 359, at 38-39.

427 SecSELIGNMAN, supra, note 281, at

65.

427

James
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Landis reported that they went through four more drafts, with limited
input of individual subcommittee members, and then two subcomnittee meetings, before anyone outside of the subcommittee was allowed
to meet with them to discuss the draft.428 James Landis noted that neither of the subcommittee meetings led to any substantial changes. 429
As the draft was ready to go to the full Commerce Committee, Sam
Rayburn acquiesced to letting a select group of top securities lawyers
review and comment on it in a closed door meeting. 430 This meeting
did not go particularly well, but appeared to result in only "a number
of technical changes particularly in the schedules to the bill that had
not had a thorough going over by the subcommittee." 431
From here, the bill went to the full Commerce Committee in a
public meeting on May 3, 1933.432 Few changes were requested by that
group, except for the addition of a couple of additional exemptions
from registration. 433 The bill was then reported out to the House on

May 4, 1933, and the next day, with relatively little debate, the bill was
unanimously adopted by that chamber.434 The House Report of May
4, 1933, sets out the fill text of this bill and shows inclusion of the fill
Schedule A with registration statement requirements for a balance
sheet and a profit and loss statement, both to be certified by an independent public or certified accountant. 435 Whether an)"of these inclusions were the result, even in part, of the Institute's lobbying seems
unknowable on the existing record. Nonetheless, the accounting profession had indeed received what it had requested.
Ironicall); this bill also reinstated the original Thompson draft
provision for the FTC to require that financial statements given to it
pursuant to an examination during the waiting period be certified by
a public or certified public accountant approved by the FTC. 436 Given
the registration statement requirements under Schedule A, however,
this may seem redundant. The Schedule A provisions, however, do not
428See Landis, supra note 359, at 39.

41 See id.
430
SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 65-66; Landis, supra note 359, at 39-40.
4-1 Landis, supra note 359, at 40-41.
432SCe SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 66; Landis, supra note 359, at 41.
433Landis, supra note 359, at 41.
44 Id.

435H.R. REP. No. 73-85 (1933) (text of reported bill, H.R. 5480), repinted in 1 FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1933-1982, supranote 361, at 36-37. Of course, this
went further than the Companies Act, 1929 in two regards: (1) it required both certified
balance sheets and profit and loss statements, and (2) it required that those certified statements be filed with the FTC, rather than simply be included in the prospectus. See id.
436See id. at 16.
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require the accountant to be approved by the FTC. Thus, this may
indicate a continuing skepticism as to the reliability of company chosen auditors. Such auditors might be acceptable for the routine registration statement filing, but where the suspicion of the FTC is aroused
about the verity of that filing, it may initiate an investigation that, inter
alha, requires a new audit to be conducted by an FTC approved auditor. This concept of routine filings coupled with adversarial, or what
might be deemed "forensic," audits may well suggest a better model
for the use of auditors in securities regulation in the future.
As to the scope of the provisions of Schedule A, there is no doubt
that it is more extensive than its counterpart, Part II of Schedule IV, of
the Companies Act, 1929. At the same time, not too much should be
made of this expansion because, as discussed above, 437 the Companies
Act, 1929, brings together all of the major legislative areas regarding
corporations and their securities, and thus requires other sorts of information in other schedules, forms, and provisions of that act. In total, these arguably cover the same ground as the single Schedule A,
which at the time was to be the only chance that federal authorities
would get to compel companies to disclose information.
Meanwhile, in the Senate, the revised Thompson bill was still
percolating along in the Banking Committee. 438 During April, it had
been amended substantially to withdraw many of the most nettlesome
provisions such that the Banking Committee's chairman would proclaim it to be quite similar to the Landis-Cohen bill. 439 Felix Frankfurter attempted to have the Senate bill withdrawn in late April, but to
no avail-it was reported out to the Senate on April 27, 1933. Despite
further efforts by Felix Frankfurter, with the assistance of Raymond
Mole), on approval from President Roosevelt, passage of the Thompson bill in the Senate was merely delayed, but ultimately achieved on
May 8, 1933.440 Somewhat out of the blue, however, an entire second
part purporting to form a federal Corporation of Foreign Security
441
Holders was tacked on just before passage.
All of these events presented a bit of a sticky wicket for the promoters of the House's Landis-Cohen bill, including President Roosevelt himself.442 Nonetheless, as the two chambers prepared to send
437 See supra notes 106-238 and accompan)ing text.
43 SeSELIGIMAN, supra note 281, at 67.
439 See id.
440
441

See id. at 67-68.
See id. at 68-69; Landis, supra note 359, at 43.

442 Landis, supra note 359, at 43.
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their delegates to meet in Conference Committee to hammer out the
final version of the bill, enough politicking was achieved in the background so that the delegates could have a "free hand" in fashioning
the final version, all under the chairmanship of Sam Rayburn, and at
the concession of Senator Fletcher.443 In the proceedings of the Conference Committee, the Thompson draft part of the Senate bill wvas
quickly dropped, while the House's Landis-Cohen bill was adopted as
the basic working draft. 444 Somewhat oddly, although likely another

political expediency, the tacked on amendment to the Senate bill was
retained. 445 After four more drafts containing amendments that weakened some of the regulatory provisions a bit, but with Schedule A intact, the final bill came out of Conference Committee, passed both
houses of Congress, and was signed into law on May 27, 1933.446
IV.

AFTERMATH

A. The '34 Act and the SEC
A little more than a year after passage of the '33 Act, President
Roosevelt was also able to get Congress to pass a second component
of his ambitious reform plan in the form of the '34 Act. 447 This latter

legislation was intended to regulate the stock exchanges, and many
of their key players like brokers and dealers." 8 It also regulated the
so-called secondary market in which issuer stock was traded amongst
members of the public after it initially was purchased directly from
the issuer, often via underwriters, in a public offering. 449
The '33 Act itself was also amended, largely to cut back on what
were perceived to be excessive liabilities imposed on company management and the directors they relied on, such as accountants. 450 In a
nutshell, the legitimate concern of those facing the prospective liabilities under the original '33 Act was that the liability seemed limited
neither to the harmed party's reliance on the defective statements
443 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 69; Landis, supra note 359, at 43-45.

444 Landis, supra note 359, at 43-45.
445 Id. Although a provision was added to stay the effectiveness of the amendment's provisions unless and until there was a presidential proclamation doing so, this apparently never
happened. See SELIGMAN, supranote 281, at 70; Landis, supra note 359, at 48-49.
446See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 69-70; Landis, supra note 359, at 45-48, 49.
447 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 73-100; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hhh (2000)).
448 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hhh.
49 See id.
450 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 94-100.
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and certifications in the prospectus nor to the direct causal role that
such statements and certifications may have played in the actual harm
alleged. 451 Adding to the pain, the liability provisions provided no cap
to damages other than the price at which the security was offered to
the public. 45 2 George May expressed the indignation of the accounting profession:
"I cannot believe that a law is just or can be long maintained
in effect which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a
purchaser may recover from a person from whom he has not
bought, in respect of a statement which at the time of his
purchase lie had not read, contained in a document which
he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not to be measured b'y injury resulting from falsity in such statement. Yet,
under the Securities Act as it stands, once a material misstatement or omission is proved, it is no defense to show that
the plaintiff had no knowledge of the statement in question
or of the document in which it was contained, or that the fall
in the value of the security which he has purchased is due,
not to the misstatement or omission complained of, but to
quite different causes, such as the natural progress of invention, or even fire or earthquake. The Securities Act not only
abandons the old rule that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff, but the doctrine of contributory negligence and the
seemingly sound theory that there should be some relation
"453
between the injury caused and the sum to be received.
James Landis, however, is quoted with a specific response to accountants regarding their new liability under the '33 Act at a meeting
of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants:
"It has been said, and very rightly in my humble opinion, that
accounting is after all a matter of opinion rather than anything else. But though this may be true I have still to see the
case of a prospective investor being offered a balance sheet
and having it carefully explained to him that this or that item
is merely an opinion or deduction from a series of other opinions mixed in with a few acknowledged facts. But the fact is
that accountancy has paraded too largely as an exact science.
151 CAREY,

supra note 23, at 192;

452
15 U.S.C. § 7 7 (g).

453CAREY, supra note

SELIGNIAN,

supra note 281, at 94-100.

23, at 192 (quoting comments of George May).
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Accountancy, as distinguished from law, has generally been
portrayed as an exact science, and its representations have
been proffered to the unlearned as representations of fact
and not of opinion. If it insists upon such fact representations,
it is, of course, fair that it should be burdened with the responsibility attendant upon such a portrayal of its results."45 4

These are tough statements to make to a room full of CPAs, but
James Landis apparently did not have a reputation for being particularly warm and fizzy. 455 Nonetheless, the edges of the perceived ex-

cesses of the '33 Act were softened by amendments introduced as part

of the '34 Act. 456 In part, these amendments were due to a return of

the public sentiment pendulum closer to the center and away from
the extremes it reached while the glaring spotlights of the Pecora Investigation highlighted every last peccadillo of nembers of the
financial services industry. 457 This allowed members of that industry

to regroup and mount a responsive campaign against what the), perceived to be the tougher provisions of the '33 Act and proposed follow-on legislation, such as the '34 Act. 458 Thus, the '34 Act itself has

been described as much more the result of compromise among the
affected parties than was the originally enacted version of the '33
Act.

45 9

Perhaps owing to this compromising nature of the '34 Act, or even
perhaps to the delegation theory allegedly espoused by James Landis in
the drafting of the '33 Act, the '34 Act sets out less detail and gives the
new SEC more power to engage in rulemaking to flesh out specifics
than its predecessor did. 460 In particular, the '34 Act requires annual

financial reporting, and allows for additional or more frequent reporting, of publicly traded companies under implementing rules to be
promulgated by the SEC. 461 Interestingly, these reports are not required
to be certified or audited under the proxisions of the '34 Act itself, but
454 Id. at 193 (quotig James M. Landis, Speech to the New Ybrk State Society of Certified Public Accountants (1933)).
455 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 63-65.
456 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77m, 77o.
457 See SELIGMAN, supra note 281, at 20-38.
458 See id. at 76-77, 89-93.
459 Sec id. at 99-100.
460 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781 (covering Securities Exchanges, SEC Rules of
Practice, and Investor Protection). The '34 Act also created the SEC, which then is to oversee and to enforce both the '33 Act and the '34 Act in place of the FTC. Id.
461 See id. §§ 78j-78n. Section 78m of the '34 Act deals especially with financial reporting. Id. § 78m.
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rather the decision to require certification is left to the SEC. 462 The

SEC, of course, did choose to promulgate rules requiring annual, quarter); and "material event" reporting, with annual reports to be certified
463
by an independent public or certified accountant.
B. The Problem of Auditor Independence
With the passage of both the '33 Act and '34 Act, however, accountants reached another major milestone and achieved a much desired goal-they could now argue that their's was a prestigious profession recognized by Congress as playing an important public role in
the fair administration of the vast financial services sector. In fact,
Chief Justice Warren Burger would sum lip this role for them decades
later in the landmark 1904 U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v.
Arthur Young & Co.:
By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent accountant assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment
relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders as
well as the investing public. This "public watchdog" function
demands that the accountant maintain total independence
from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to
464
the public trust.

Between enactment of the '34 Act and the Young case, however,
the SEC wouldi wield its exclusive power to define who qualifies as an
"independent public or certified accountant" to achieve virtual regulation of CPAs-at least those who wanted to perform the initially stable
465
and lucrative statutory audits for publicly traded corporate clients.

Nevertheless, as accountants' engagements with audit clients became
multi-faceted-including tax work, consulting, and an ever-increasing
array of other non-audit services-the SEC's job making sure the accountant-as-auditor wvas "independent" of the client, so as to be able
to render an objective and accurate opinion, became ever more
certified if required by the
462 See id. § 781n(a) (2) (stating that "such annual reports ....
rules and regulations of the [SEC] by independent public accountants" (emphasis
added)).
463 Regulation 13A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, -13 (2004).
4- 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984).
465 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 8-10.
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difficult. 466

The result was a labyrinthian compendium of principle,
rules, interpretations, and no-action letters whose sole constant feature seemed to be change. 467 The most recent revision to this bramble
bush is the auditor independence provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002.468 Now, any such certification or audit required by the
SEC must be performed by a "registered public accounting firm" who
must register with a new quasi-public bod), the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the "PCAOB"), and comply with a new set
of independence rules that overlap with the existing SEC rules.

469

Adding to this confusion, the accounting profession has long had
its own independence rules as established by the AICPA in its Code of
Professional Conduct. 470 Yet, in the wake of Enron and other scandals,
none of these myriad sources and details of independence regulation
appear to have been fully effective. 471 Of course, it may be too soon to
tell whether the "new" independence regime under Sarbanes-Oxley
will prove more effective than its predecessors. This is unlikely however, as the "new" regime largely seems simply to import the existing
SEC independence rules into the statutory codification of the '34

Act. 472 While this "promotion" from "mere" rules to statutory lan-

guage may have some enforcement value, it may not be enough to
overcome the widely acknowledged problems and failures of the existing auditor independence regulatory mechanism. 473
46 See id. at 53-70.
467 See id. at 10-23. The codification of these rules is at (1) Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 210.2-01(b)-(c) (2004), and (2) Codification of Financial Reporting Policies §§ 601602, reptinted in SEC Accounting Rules (CCH)
3872, at 3796. The Codification of
Financial Reporting Policies is not intended to supplant the rules set forth in Regulation SX, but is intended instead only to supplement those rules.
468 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2004)).
469 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78j-78n. Note that section 78m(a) (2) still refers to "independent
public accountants." See id. § 78m(a) (2).
470 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

http://wwwaicpa.org/about/code/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004); see also O'Connor,
supra note 14, at 24-37.
471 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 1-3. See generally WAillian W. Bratton, Enron, Sabancs-Oxley, and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023 (2003);
John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingEnron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid. " 57 Bus. LAW.
1403 (2002); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Shating Accounting's Burden: Business LawyezS in
Enron 's Dar*Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421 (2002).
472 Cunningham, supra note 388, at 918-19, 943-54; see also Bratton, supra note 471, at
1031-32.
473 Lawrence A. Cunningham also suggests that Sarbanes-Oxlev' was really a way for
Congress to appear to be doing something profound in rapid response to the corporate
and financial services meltdown after Enron and other scandals, while in fact doing noth-
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Accordingl; there is little reason to believe that the critical problems of auditor independence will be remedied by "tweaking" the
current system. If this cannot be done, however, then what might be
done instead?
C. Be Carefil What You Wish For
In short, the problem of auditor independence was created by
the federal securities laws: initiall); through the statutory audit provision for prospectuses in the '33 Act, and then exacerbated by the de
facto extension of this audit to an annual requirement under the '34
Act. In particular, the small change from the Companies Acts precedents of shareholder election of "auditors"-as that term was understood in the British tradition-to the unspecified method of retaining
"independent public or certified accountants" in the '33 Act and '34
Act (together, the "Securities Laws"), set off a cascade of negative effects that leveraged off the broad cultural differences in accounting
and auditing on different sides of the Atlantic.
To recap, the British tradition of audits is based on a principal's
employ of a trusted agent to check up on the disposition of the principal's assets and affairs. 474 This is a straight agency relationship that
has loose connections with agency accounting theories-although the
concept of "auditor" is not coextensive with that of "accountant." In
some cases the auditor was working for a single principal, in other
cases the auditor might have been working on behalf of a class of persons, but in all cases the auditor's services were provided towards what
should be a unitary set of interests. 47 Later, even as business account-

ing theories such as proprietorship and entity accounting developed,
the role of the auditor did not necessarily follow. Rather, the auditor
continued to work on behalf of individuals or classes with a unitary set
476
of interests, such as shareholders.
In the later developing American tradition, however, "auditors"
were nearly always accountants and their audits often were used by
ing and preserving the status quo until either the crisis subsided or it could figure out the
"right" thing to do. Cunningham, supra note 388, at 979-80.
474See supra notes 22-230 and accompanying text.
475 See supra notes 106-230 and accompanying text. An example is the townspeople
checking tip on their local municipal treasurer. See supra notes 106-230 and accompanying
text.
476 Cf.William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value, Financial Conservatism, and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE Lj. 439, 446-62 (2003) (arguing that even subsets of current shareholders
may have different needs and goals regarding audits and financial statement disclosure).
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multiple parties with clearly distinct interests. 477 Thus, the theories of
proprietorship and entity accounting may have had more impact on
American auditors. In the former, the accountant/auditor was to distinguish between all of a natural person's financial affairs-business
and personal-taken together, and those specific assets implicated
directly in a defined, ongoing proprietary enterprise. 478 In the latter,
the accountant/auditor distinguished between an agency relationship
with one or more natural persons, and one with a corporation or
479
other legal, but non-natural person.

Further, whereas the British system has unitary sources of regulation for both corporations and chartered accountants, the American
system consists of a confising, and sometimes conflicting, pastiche of
varying state laws concerning corporations and CPAs, partially preempted by federal laws in limited domains such as securities regulation. This likely made it difficult for any cultural tradition regarding
audits and auditors to develop and may be yet another reason why
American accountants and lawmakers continually looked to the British Companies Acts for guidance.
As one might expect, however, problems arise when specific provisions are lifted-and modified-from their place in a coherent and
comprehensive whole. To be fair, President Roosevelt and his New
Dealers appeared to want to move all corporate and accounting regulation to the federal level, but the), were unable to do so. Their failure
perhaps led to a worst of both worlds situation in which rules for accountants were removed partially from their existing location in state
law and placed in a federal system without the necessary surrounding
provisions that provided such critical context as they did for the British audit system.
Paramount in this surrounding context was the conceptual separation of the auditor and accounting roles, and the allegiance of the
auditor to the owners (shareholders) of the company. The centuriesold British audit tradition, combined with the placement of hiring
and compensation power in the hands of the principal(s) under the
Companies Acts, created an environment in which it was clear what
the auditor's role was and for whom the auditor was working. When
the Securities Laws left it open as to who would hire and set compensation for the auditors, this responsibility fell to management and/or
477 See supra notes 239-310 and accompanying text.
478 See supra note

30.

479 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
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the board of directors-the very parties upon whom the auditors were
supposed to be checking up on! Further, the statutory language simply directing companies to have certain financial statements certified
by an independent public or certified accountant minimized the
richer tradition of the British auditor as an officer of the company,
working on behalf of shareholders.
Not surprisingl), the audit system established under the Securities
Laws instead created a culture in which outside accountants are hired
merely to perform a professional service to certify financial statements on behalf of the "company," with a host of implied duties to
creditors, directors, and the "investing public," not to mention a duty
to shareholders and possibly even employees. Of course, all of these
groups of beneficiaries have markedly different interests. Thus, the
American accountant/auditor is placed in the untenable position of
the agent serving many masters with conflicting interests. In such an imbroglio, is it an) wonder that the group who hires, fires, and sets
compensation for the auditor becomes the de facto client? Over time,
laudable efforts to establish protections such as audit committees of
company boards that would insulate auditors from the direct influence of management have been instituted. These still fail, however, to
take the simple step of pushing control of the audit relationship back
to shareholders where it belongs.
It is not clear why the Landis-Cohen team chose to include an audit provision for prospectuses that clearly was derived from the Companies Act, 1929, yet was altered in such crucial ways. Perhaps they felt
that the very lack of a comprehensive federal corporation regulating
mechanism such as the Companies Act, 1929, would create problems
for a more closely followed audit provision because the '33 Act was not
broad enough in scope to dictate a general auditor for stock issuing
companies. Alternatively, perhaps the team felt it would be more palatable to modify the British audit to more closely track the developing
American corporate practice of publicly disclosed audits (such as Colonel Carter argued, albeit unpersuasively, to the Banking Committee).
Regardless of how it came to be, the form of the audit provision set
out in the enacted '33 Act was then picked up by the '34 Act and the
SEC rules promulgated thereunder. This set in place the American
form, which has subsequently proved to be extremely difficult to dislodge. Further, by mandating what was arguably a useful quality signaling best practice, the Securities Laws turned it into a mere commodity-a cost of doing business that should be dispensed with as cheaply
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as possible. 48 0 Over time, as one would predict, the profit margins for
statutory audits became razor thin as the serice was transformed from
a premium into a commodity-in some accounts, it has actually been
run as a loss leader simply to give accountants access to corporate decisionmakers in the quest for premium consulting engagements. 481
At the same time, while it has been endlessly "tweaked," the core
structure of the American audit, replete with all the independence
issues it creates, remains firmly in place. Beyond suggesting to replace
it with one more closely modeled after the British systen-in particular, placing control of the audit relationship in the hands of the
shareholders-this Article does not examine whether the British system is in fact demonstrably better than the American system. Rather,
it simply starts from the premise that the American systeln has not
worked particularly well and argues that this failure is due to the misapplication of the British precedent. Accordingly, any true solution
for the problem of auditor independence must start from when and
how it was created-a story that this Article does explore in detail.
Ironically, the American system has not worked out that well for
the accountants either. To be sure, they received a governmentmandated windfall concession, and this concession may well have led
to the phenomenal growth and consolidation of the major accounting
firms. 482 Although perhaps not as an intentional quid pro quo, however, the Landis-Cohen team also saddled the accountants with substantial liabilities for their choice role in the securities issuing process.
Additionally perhaps more importantly the profession has been hobbled ever since by the fast-growing complexities and limitations involved in maintaining auditor independence-even as the largest
firms transformed themselves into international professional services
behemoths. Currently the Big Four firms continue to wrestle with
what to do with their lucrative consulting divisions-the very divisions
that also create the most visible independence challenges through
provision of non-audit serxices to audit clients.

480See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 62-63.
481 See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 17 CFR pts.
210, 240, § Im(C) (2) (a) (i) (2001) (codifying Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7919, 34-43602,
35-27279, IC-24744, IA-1911, and FR-56 (Nov. 21, 2000)), available at http://AwN;sec.gov/
rules/final/33-7919.htm (last modified Oct. 12, 2001); Arthur Levitt, Renewing the Covenant with Investors, Speech at New York University Center for Law and Business (May 10,
2000), at http://ww.sec.gov/ne-s/speech/spch370.htm (last modified May 26, 2000).
482 See O'Connor, supra note 14, at 68-69.
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Ask members of the former Arthur Andersen about the problems
of audits and independence. Even before the Enron debacle that restilted in its criminal conviction and implosion, the firm had suffered
through a nasty divorce from its consulting arm, Andersen Consulting
(now Accenture).483 This divorce, however, was arguably the culmination of the growth of the audit and tax services under the substantial
business generated by both the income tax law of 1913 and the Securities Laws, which in turn led to the firm's ability to create and grow
the consulting practices. 48 4 Yet, hemmed in by independence rules,
the consulting services could not filly prosper until the firm secured
a unique no-action letter from the SEC blessing a novel separation of
the firm into tvo distinct legal entities--one for tax and audit and
one for consulting. 48 5 Neither controlled the other, but both were
"coordinated," along with the firm's overseas legal entities, through
contracts established with yet another entity, the Swiss-based Andersen
486
Worldwide.
Over time, the partners at Andersen Consulting came to resent
the obligations they had to the Arthur Andersen member firms
through the Andersen Worldwide Organization. In particular, the
Andersen Consulting partners felt that their earnings were being tinfairly targeted by the profit-sharing provisions of the inter-firm
agreements (even though the net flow of money had been reversed
earlier in the organization's history). They also felt that the Arthur
A dersen member firms were creating harmful competition within
the Andersen Worldwide Organization by allegedly developing new
consulting divisions. 487 Eventuall)y they sought and received an arbitration award that allowed them simply to walk away from the worldwide Andersen family of firms. 488 This was a major blow to the U.S.
483See id. at 57-58.

484See Final Award, Andersen Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Bus.
Unit Mlember Firms & Andersen Worldwide Societe Coop., Int'l Comm. Arb. 4-25 (2000) (No.
9797/CK/AER/ACS) [hereinafter Final Award]; see also ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., A ViSION OF GRANDEUR 84, 92-93 (giving a history of Arthur Andersen & Co., published by the
firm for its seventy-fifth anniversary).
485 SecArthur Andersen & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 79,484, at 77,457 (June 20, 1990).
4 See FinalAward, supra note 484, at 10-14; ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., supra note 484,
at 84, 92-93. Of historical note, Harvey Pitt, then of Fried Frank, and later SEC Chairman,
signed the no-action letter request for allowance of this convoluted structure-although it
is unclear what role he played in creation of the structure. See Arthur Andersen & Co.,
supra note 485, at 77,457.
487See FinalAward at 4-25, 116-18.
4

&SSec id.
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Arthur Andersen entity and arguably played some role in the subsequent downward spiral of the firm. Even as it then attempted to grow
a sort of replacement consulting division, Arthur Andersen Business
Consulting, within the Arthur Andersen entity, the firm became increasingly mired in independence issues. It also faced the same apparent general decline in profitability of the once dependable cash
cow statutory audit that the other members of the then-Big Five
faced. 489 It is difficult to tell what proportional role all of these factors
played in the demise of Arthur Andersen, but in the end the) collectively killed the firm.
Thus, the very thing the accounting profession so desired at the
dawn of the twentieth century-to be acknowledged as a "true" profession and entrusted with an important and respected role in society-may well have led it to accept, and even advocate for, its Achilles'
heel of auditor independence. To be held to the higher standard that
arguably separates a "profession" from a mere business enterprise,
however, one must then live up to that standard, perhaps even when it
means declining lucrative engagements and diminishing the bottom
line. Or, maybe it is just another Great Gatsby-type story, in which an
all-consuming desire to "better one's position" in life blinds the protagonist to the reality of life beyond the dock with the green light. 490

At any rate, in postscript then, be careful what you wish for-you
might actually get it.

11 Scc supra note 479.
490 Sec generally F. ScoTr
1986) (1925).
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